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Introduction 
In the few decades since its invention, the World Wide Web has exerted a profound influence on 
practically every sphere of human activity. Online stores have transformed the way we purchase 
goods, social networking sites have transformed the way we stay in touch with friends, and real-time 
news feeds have transformed the way we stay abreast of current affairs. For better or worse, it 
seems, the Web is poised to have a significant influence on the way we live our lives, and perhaps 
ultimately it will come to influence the social, political and economic forces that determine the way 
our lives are lived.  
The rapid growth and penetration of the Web raises important questions about its effects, not just 
on our social activities, but also on the nature of our cognitive and epistemic profiles. The Web is a 
transformative technology, but its transformative influence does not necessarily stop at the social 
processes that govern our everyday interactions with one another. Many technologies that have 
transformed society (for example, the clock, the map and systems of writing), have also exerted 
subtle  (and  sometimes  not  so  subtle)  effects  on  our  cognitive  and  intellectual  capabilities.  The 
invention  of  the  mechanical  clock,  for  example,  contributed  not  only  to  widespread  social  and 
economic change (see Landes, 2000); it also contributed to a profound shift in the way we saw 
ourselves and the nature of our cognitive abilities. Prior to the invention of reliable and widely 
accessible time-keeping devices, the nature of our daily activity was structured according to the 
chronology of the natural world. The sun signalled the start of the working day, while the onset of 
night signalled a time to sleep. The invention of portable time-keeping devices changed all that. 
Suddenly,  it  was  possible  to  organize  and  synchronize  activities  in  a  way  that  had  never  been 
possible before, and on the back of this new capability there emerged a new social and economic 
era. The influence of the clock, however, was not just limited to the nature of our social interactions 
and engagements; it also effected a profound shift in our cognitive power and potential. As Clark 
(2003) argues: 
“The presence of easily accessible, fairly accurate, and consistently available time-
telling resources enabled the individual to factor time constantly and accurately 
into the very heart of her endeavours and aspirations. This made possible ways of 
thought, and cultural practices and institutions, which were otherwise precluded 
by our basic biological nature.” (pg. 40) 
Carr (2010) is also impressed by the cognitive and intellectual repercussions of the clock’s invention. 
He writes that: 
“The mechanical clock changed the way we saw ourselves. And like the map, it 
changed the way we thought. Once the clock had redefined time as a series of 
units of equal duration, our minds began to stress the methodical mental work of 
division and measurement. We began to see, in all things and phenomena, the 




the  pieces  were  made.  Our  thinking  became  Aristotelian  in  its  emphasis  on 
discerning abstract patterns behind the visible surfaces of the material world. The 
clock played a crucial role in propelling us out of the middle ages and into the 
renaissance and then the enlightenment.” (pg. 43) 
As with the invention of clocks, the emergence of the Web is, I think, a highly significant event in our 
social, economic and cultural history. Like the invention of the clock, the Web is supporting the 
emergence of new forms of social interaction and engagement, and ultimately these may manifest 
themselves in more profound forms of social and economic change. The Web also has the potential 
to change the nature of our cognitive and epistemic profiles. The Web provides new opportunities 
for  interaction  and  engagement  with  a  global  space  of  information,  and,  in  some  cases,  such 
interactive opportunities may contribute to fundamental shifts in the way we see ourselves and the 
nature of our cognitive capabilities. 
The idea that a technology as pervasive and as popular as the Web may be changing our cognitive 
profile is something that is bound to raise both interest and alarm. Over the past couple of years, 
considerable attention has been devoted to the issue of whether the Web is affecting our social, 
emotional and cognitive abilities. For the most part, much of the rhetoric in this debate has been 
negative. The Web has been seen as exerting a largely pernicious influence on our ability to think, 
read  and  remember,  apparently  undermining  our  ability  to  engage  in  ‘linear  thought’,  and 
encouraging us to adopt highly superficial forms of information processing (Carr, 2008, 2010). But 
what is the real cognitive impact of the Web, and should we be alarmed if it stands to fundamentally 
alter the nature of our cognitive and epistemic profiles?  
In this paper, I will attempt to provide an overview of what I see as the important issues in the 
debate regarding the relationship between human cognition and the Web. I will argue that the Web, 
like many technologies, is poised to transform the nature of our cognitive and epistemic profiles, and 
for this reason we should take the views of Carr (2008, 2010) and others very seriously. However, I 
will argue that much of the negative rhetoric in the debate over the Web’s influence on human 
cognition is unwarranted. The Web does stand to influence the power and potential of human 
cognition, but in order to fully understand this influence we need to factor in the available scientific 
evidence, the changing nature of our interaction with the Web, and the possibility that many of our 
everyday  cognitive  achievements  already  depend  on  complex  webs  of  social  and  technological 
scaffolding. I will argue that the worries and concerns of Carr and others are largely unfounded (on 
empirical  and  philosophical  grounds)  and  that  we  should  not  be  overly  negative  in  our 
characterization of the Web’s influence on our cognitive capabilities. Firstly, the scientific evidence 
that would warrant such a conclusion is simply not available, and much more research needs to be 
undertaken before we can establish a scientifically informed view. Secondly, even if the evidence 
does suggest the Web is undermining our cognitive abilities, we need to be aware that the Web is 
constantly evolving. Current modes of interaction with the Web do not necessarily limit (or even 
limn) the space of interactive opportunities that could be created by future forms of technological 
innovation. We should, as a consequence, be very wary of blanket statements to the effect that the 
Web is undermining our cognitive capabilities. Our notions of what the Web is and what it may yet 
become are constantly changing, and not all forms of the Web are likely to exert the same kind of 
influence on our cognitive capabilities. Above all, I want to suggest that when we think about the 




grounded  on  more  than  the  processing  operations of  the  bare  biological  brain.  Many  forms of 
cognitive competence, I will suggest, are based on the delicate coupling of a variety of resources into 
complex  nexuses  of  informational  flow  and  influence  that  span  the  biological,  social  and 
technological domains (Clark, 1997, 2008; Smart et al., 2010a). If such claims are true, then the 
cognitive capabilities of the human agent are not necessarily those of the technologically-decoupled 
brain, and the information processing capabilities of the biologically-bounded individual always need 
to be judged relative to the capabilities of the bio-technological systems in which that individual 
typically participates. From this perspective, we should not judge the Web solely on the basis of its 
effects  on  bio-cognitive  processing.  Instead,  we  should  attempt  to  understand  more  about  the 
cognitive  capabilities  and  limitations  of  the  human  individual  working  in  concert  with  Web 
technologies. Only then will we be able to judge whether the World Wide Web contributes to our 
cognitive good or ill. 
The structure of this paper  is organized around five key issues. In ‘The Cognitive Impact of the Web’, 
I attempt to examine the effect of the Web on human cognitive functioning. For the most part, this 
discussion is based on what we might consider as the conventional Web; i.e. the Web of HTML 
documents  that  are  traditionally  accessed  using  Web  browser  technology.  I  firstly  review  the 
concerns raised by Carr (2008, 2010) that the Web, and the Internet more generally, is undermining 
our ability to think, read and remember. I then go on to look at some of the scientific evidence that 
might support, or fail to support, such a view. In the section entitled ‘Changing the Way We Think?’, I 
consider the specific question of whether the Web is changing the way we think. This question 
resembles that which was recently posed by the Edge Foundation as part of their Annual Question 
series
1 (the specific question asked by the Edge Foundation was ‘HOW IS THE INTERNET CHANGING 
THE WAY YOU THINK?’). It is not my aim in this paper to provide a specific answer to this question. 
Rather, I attempt to highlight a number of issues that affect how the question might be addressed. 
As is indicated by the broad range of responses to the Edge Foundation’s question, the issue of 
whether the Web is changing the way we think is something that depends very much on how we 
interpret the phrase ‘the way we think’, and on what we mean by the ‘Web’. In the section entitled 
‘Extending the Mind: Cognitive Extension and the Future Web’, I consider the limitations of the 
current Web in terms of its ability to support the emergence of extended cognitive systems. This 
section expands on a discussion that has appeared in a number of places concerning the possibility 
of Web-based forms of cognitive extension and the emergence of ‘Web-extended minds’ (Smart et 
al., 2008; Smart et al., 2009; Smart et al., 2010a). In the context of this paper, I seek to identify those 
features of the Web that present barriers to the emergence of extended cognitive systems, and I 
attempt to provide a vision of the future Web in which most of these barriers are removed. In the 
section entitled ‘Creativity and Collective Cognition’, I focus on the potential effects of the Web in 
relation to more socially-distributed forms of cognitive processing; in particular, I focus on the way in 
which the Web may help (or hinder) some of the social processes associated with creativity. Finally, 
in the section entitled ‘Cognition and the Web: An Agenda for Web Science’, I attempt to highlight 
some of the issues for future scientific work in this area. Given that recent scientific effort around 
the Web has coalesced into a new scientific discipline, namely that of Web Science (Berners-Lee et 
al., 2006; Hendler et al., 2008; Shadbolt & Berners-Lee, 2008), I suggest that many of the issues 
relating to cognition and the Web could form part of the emerging Web Science research agenda.  
                                                           




The Cognitive Impact of the Web 
The question of whether the Web, and the Internet more generally, is affecting aspects of the 
human mind has, understandably, been the focus of much recent scientific attention and media 
interest. The Web has rapidly gained in popularity, so whatever its cognitive effects they are likely to 
be  widespread.  One  of  the  biggest  concerns  is  that  the  Web  is  changing  the  way  we  process 
information, causing us to rapidly process lots of disparate information at a rather superficial level 
rather than encouraging us to engage in any kind of deep information processing (Carr, 2008, 2010). 
One of the most vocal supporters of the view that the Internet is changing the way we think is 
Nicholas Carr. His concern is that our contact with the Web is contributing to a significant, and not 
necessarily beneficial, change in our cognitive profiles: 
“As the media theorist Marshall McLuhan pointed out in the 1960s, media are not 
just passive channels of information. They supply the stuff of thought, but they 
also  shape  the  process  of  thought.  And  what  the  Net  seems  to  be  doing  is 
chipping away at my capacity for concentration and contemplation. My mind now 
expects to take in information the way the Net distributes it: in a swiftly moving 
stream of particles. Once I was a scuba diver in the sea of words. Now I zip along 
the surface like a guy on a jet ski” (Carr, 2008; pg 57). 
In  his  recent  book,  “The  Shallows:  How  the  Internet  is  Changing  the  Way  we  Think,  Read  and 
Remember”, Carr (2010) argues that the Web
2 is having a number of effects on human cognition. 
Instead of enhancing our ability to concentrate,  Carr argues that  the Web is undermining our 
capacity for sustained periods of focused attention. And instead of enhancing our ability to think 
deeply about a topic, the Web is undermining our ability to engage in protracted episodes of what is 
referred to as ‘linear thinking’. The result of these changes is a curtailment and fragmentation of 
otherwise temporally-protracted episodes of cognitive activity, coupled with the adoption of highly 
superficial forms of information processing. We have, according to Carr, become far more easily 
distractible and “thinly spread”. In the words of the playwright Richard Foreman, we have become 
“pancake people”; people whose cognitive resources are now “spread wide and thin, as we connect 
with that vast network of information access by the mere touch of a button.” 
The constellation of cognitive changes alluded to by Carr is rather hard to categorize in terms of 
conventional psycho-cognitive processes; however, in general, the changes are ones that are related 
to  cognitive  control  functions,  comprehension  processes  and  reward-mediated  behaviours.  In 
particular, Carr’s analysis suggests that our contact with the Web may be producing the following 
changes: 
1.  Shallow and superficial modes of information processing.  Instead of an ability to think 
deeply  about  a  particular  topic  or  issue,  we  now  process  information  at  a  far  more 
superficial level. Whereas before we had the ability to be deeply immersed in a text, now we 
are limited to more cursory forms of analysis. This kind of deficit can be linked to the ‘levels 
of  processing’  literature,  in  which  it  has  been  shown  that  our  ability  to  remember 
information is linked to the depth at which the information is processed (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). Information that has been subjected to deep, semantic processing can be recalled 
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much better than information that has been processed at a much more superficial level (see 
Eysenck, 1974). 
2.  Heightened distractibility. Instead of an ability for sustained periods of focused attention, 
we are now far more susceptible to the distracting influence of task-irrelevant stimuli.  
3.  An inability to sustain episodes of cognitive activity. Instead of an ability to ‘stay-on-task’, 
we are now liable to a premature curtailment of temporally-protracted episodes of cognitive 
activity. 
4.  A  change  in  the  rewarding  impact  of  conventional  printed  media.  Instead  of  finding 
pleasure  in  books,  we  are  now  easily  bored  by  reading.  This  intimates  at  potential 
differences in the reward and reinforcement processes associated with different media.  
Importantly, these changes are assumed by Carr to be relatively enduring. They persist beyond the 
periods of time that we are actively using the Web, and they thus reflect enduring changes in our 
cognitive profiles.  
Given the nature of the putative cognitive changes, it is clearly important to know something about 
the validity of Carr’s claims. The problem is that many of the claims made by Carr are based largely 
on anecdotal evidence. There is little direct scientific evidence to support the notion that the Web is 
currently introducing fundamental changes in our cognitive profile. This is important because even if 
it could be shown that our cognitive profile is changing, it is by no means clear that the Web itself is 
responsible for the change. Perhaps few people who make extensive use of the Web would disagree 
with  Carr  when  he  says  that  we  are  losing  our  capacity  for  deep  thinking  and  sustained 
concentration. However, it is by no means clear that the Web itself is responsible for these changes. 
One  possibility  is  that  people  who make  frequent  use  of  the  Web  are  also likely  to  engage  in 
something called “media multitasking”, which involves the concurrent processing of information 
content  from  two  or  more  media  sources  (for  example,  surfing  the  Web  and  processing  SMS 
messages). Media multitasking has been linked to an altered cognitive profile, characterized by the 
adoption of breadth-based cognitive control strategies (Ophir et al., 2009), and this alteration in 
cognitive functioning might account for some of the putative cognitive changes alluded to by Carr 
(certainly some of the deficits described by Carr seem to involve alterations in cognitive control 
processes). Another issue concerns the effect of age on our cognitive abilities. It is well-known that 
some aspects of our cognitive profile change with age, and at least some of these changes are 
consistent with the deficits described by Carr (for example, see Braver & Barch, 2002). If we are 
trying to understand the reason for an age-related alteration in our own cognitive functioning, then 
we may search for answers in the external environment rather than ourselves. The Web, in this case, 
emerges  as  an  obvious  scapegoat.  It  was  introduced  relatively  recently,  and it  has  precipitated 
profound changes in the way we consume  and communicate information. This makes it a very 
salient and convenient target in our efforts to account for age-related declines in our cognitive 
capabilities. 
Many  studies  have  sought  to  examine  the  effect  of  hypermedia  environments  on  aspects  of 
cognitive function. In one study, for example, Zhu (1999) examined the effect of the number of 
hyperlinks on learning performance. He discovered that readers were better able to learn from texts 
that had fewer links (3-7 links per node) rather than a larger number of links (8-12 links per node). 
This  suggests  that  larger  numbers  of  links  may  affect  a  reader’s  ability  to  process  information 




environments; for example, the effect of different hyperlink topologies. In general, the results from 
these studies suggest that, when it comes to the recall of factual content, linear texts (i.e. texts in 
which there is a linear sequence of nodes and navigation is restricted to ‘next’ and ‘previous’ links) 
contribute to better recall performance compared to other kinds of hypertext (for example, texts in 
which links are embedded in the text itself and navigation is not restricted to a linear sequence of 
nodes) (see DeStefano & LeFevre, 2007). Such results may indirectly support some of Carr’s claims 
about the way in which we process information on the Web. If we do resort to a shallow form of 
information processing – one in which we largely refrain from any kind of deep, semantic processing 
– then we may expect subjects to recall relatively less when they are confronted with Web-like 
hypermedia environments
3. The problem is that it is difficult to know exactly what accounts for the 
reduced recall performance. It could be that complex hypermedia environments encourage rather 
superficial forms of information processing, or it could be  that other features of the hypermedia 
environment are interfering with the proper encoding of information conte nt. For example, the 
visual cues used to highlight the presence of a hyperlink may increase the visual processing demands 
associated with a hyperlinked resource (especially when these links are embedded in the main body 
of a text), and this may be contributing to an increase in cognitive load (see DeStefano & LeFevre, 
2007). 
Another  problem with studies  that focus  on the  offline  recall of information (i.e. recall in the 
absence of any kind of interaction with the hypermedia resource) is that they do not necessarily tell 
us anything about the  effect of hypermedia environments on real -world cognitive performance. 
Clearly, the fact that a particular kind of hypermedia environment  (e.g. one featuring a particular 
kind of link topology)   negatively affects  the offline recall of presented information  does  tell  us 
something about the effect of Web resources on (bio-)memory processes. It is not clear, however, 
that these effects really matter when it comes to our everyday use of the Web. Perhaps subjects do 
not need to remember information when they interact with the Web because the reliable presence 
of Web-accessible information content effectively  functions as a form of external or ‘extended’ 
memory  (see  Smart,  2010).  In  this  case,  the  kind  of  performance  deficits  seen  in  laboratory 
situations would not extend to the real world. In addition, it has been shown that subjects will 
refrain  from  memorizing  information  content  if  the  cost  of  accessing  information  from  the 
environment is sufficiently  low  (Gray & Fu, 2004; Waldron et al., 2007). As such, one  potential 
explanation of the results from recall-based studies is that hypertext environments simply reduce 
the cost of accessing relevant information and therefore discourage the use of internal, biologically-
based memorization strategies.  
As an alternative to measuring offline abilities (like the ability to recall factual content), we can also 
measure aspects of a subject’s online performance. For example, we can provide the subject with an 
initial opportunity to browse a hyperlinked information resource, and then ask him or her to locate 
target information while actively interacting with the resource. In one study of this kind, McDonald 
and Stevenson (1996) compared navigation performance (measured as the time taken to locate 
answers  to  specific  questions)  in  three  hypertext  conditions.  In  one  condition,  subjects  were 
presented with linear text, a linear sequence of textual nodes in which navigation was restricted to 
successor  and  precursor  nodes.  In  a  second  condition,  subjects  were  presented  with  a  strictly 
hierarchical text, a hyperlinked resource in which the nodes are organized in a hierarchical fashion 
                                                           




(in  this  condition,  hyperlinks  support  navigation  to  subordinate  or  superordinate  nodes  in  the 
hierarchy). Finally, in a third condition, subjects were presented with nonlinear hypertext. This final 
condition  most  closely  resembles  the  state-of-affairs  that  is  encountered  on  the  Web,  with 
hyperlinks  embedded  in  the  text  supporting  navigation  to  nodes  outside  of  a  strict  linear  or 
hierarchical sequence. The number of links in each condition was lowest in the linear condition and 
highest in the nonlinear hypertext condition, with hierarchical hypertext having an intermediate 
number  of  links.  The  results  suggested  that  as  the  number  of  links  increased,  navigation 
performance decreased. It thus took subjects longer to find target information in the  nonlinear 
hypertext condition than either the linear or hierarchical hypertext conditions. 
What the results of  studies by  McDonald and Stevenson  (1996) and Zhu (1999) suggest  is that 
increasing the number of links in a hypertext resource does not seem to promote either the recall of 
information content or the adoption of more efficient navigational strategies. In fact, the available 
evidence  suggests  that  the  inclusion  of  lots  of  embedded  hyperlinks  may  actually  undermine  a 
subject’s ability to recall information while disconnected from the hypermedia environment. This 
performance deficit does not seem to be compensated for by an ability to retrieve information more 
quickly when actively engaged with the environment
4.  
In a review of the literature concerning the effects of hypert ext features on cognitive processing, 
DeStefano and LeFevre  (2007) propose that the effect of hypertext on  cognitive performance is 
mediated by an increase in cognitive load. They suggest that each time a user encounters a 
hyperlink, he or she has to make a decision as to whether or not to follow the link, and this increases 
the cognitive demands on the user. There are a number of ways in which hypermedia environments 
may increase a user’s cognitive load. Firstly, as DeStefano and LeFevre (2007) suggest, users may 
need to decide whether or not to follow a link whenever it is encountered in a text. Secondly, the 
mere presence of links, indicated as they are by a variety of visual cues (e.g. a change in font), may 
impose  visual  processing  demands  that  are  simply  not  seen  in  conventional,  non-linked  textual 
resources. Thirdly, individual nodes in a hypermedia environment, such as the World Wide Web, 
typically feature a variety of textual and non-textual elements. More often than not, individual pages 
on the Web are composed of a confusing mish-mash of multi-media components, many of which are 
semantically unrelated to the main content of the page. Page animations, adverts, sidebars, inline 
videos,  pop-up  boxes,  image  rollovers,  complex  menu  navigation  systems  and  all  manner  of 
decorative gee-gaws present the user with a plethora of opportunities for distraction that simply do 
not exist in the context of a conventional printed book. Finally, if the user does decide to follow a 
link, they are presented with the additional task of integrating information between the source and 
destination node. In the case where the content of the destination node is semantically-unrelated to 
the content of the source node, the reader experiences a disruption in narrative continuity that, in 
all likelihood, increases demands on working memory. 
One source of evidence that hypermedia environments impose greater cognitive demands on users 
comes  from  studies  of  individual  differences  in  working  memory  capacity.  If  hypermedia 
environments require the use of more processing resources than other information environments, 
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then individuals that have more of those resources should be relatively less affected than individuals 
that have fewer resources. Lee and Tedder (2003) tested this hypothesis using students who scored 
high, medium or low on a test of working memory capacity. The students were exposed to one of 
three kinds of texts (linear, hierarchical or networked), and the effect of the texts was subsequently 
measured using the method of offline recall. The results revealed that recall was highest in the linear 
condition,  and  that  the  advantage of  the  linear  text  was  greatest  for  students  with  the  lowest 
working  memory  scores.  The  results  are  therefore  consistent  with  the  idea  that  hypermedia 
environments can increase working memory demands, thereby causing individuals with low working 
memory capacity to be especially vulnerable to the cognitive sequelae of hypermedia environments.  
The available empirical results on the effect of hypermedia environments therefore suggest that we 
may  process  Web-based  information  content  in  a  way  that  is  different  from  that  seen  with 
conventional printed media. A key problem seems to be the effect of embedded hyperlinks and 
unrestricted  navigation  opportunities.  When  we  encounter  a  resource  that  features  many 
hyperlinks, it seems that we may experience an increase in cognitive load relative to that which is 
seen  in  the  case  of  conventional  non-linked  resources  or  printed  materials.  The  result  of  this 
increase in cognitive load is a diminished ability to recall and locate relevant target information.  
Some of this evidence is compatible with the views of Carr regarding the effects of the Web on our 
cognitive abilities. Carr (2010) argues, for example, that hyperlinks are instrumental in contributing 
to a profile of heightened distractibility: 
“Links  don't  just  point  us  to  related  or  supplemental  works;  they  propel  us 
towards  them.  Hyperlinks  are  designed  to  grab  our  attention.  Their  value  as 
navigational tools is inextricable from the distraction they cause.” (pg. 90) 
Carr’s main concern, however, is not that the Web is affecting our cognitive abilities during the time 
in which we are actually using the Web – during the time we are actually online – he is much more 
concerned about the long-term effects of the Web. In particular, Carr is worried that the Web is 
undermining our ability to process information obtained from any source, including our ability to 
process information derived from conventional printed media. What evidence is there for this more 
enduring effect of the Web on our cognitive functioning? 
The evidence is, in fact, limited or non-existent. The only study that really supports the case for 
enduring technology-mediated changes in cognitive functioning is a study by Ophir et al (2009). 
Ophir et al (2009) were interested in the effects of something called media multitasking. This is the 
concurrent consumption of information from more than one media stream; for example, browsing 
the Web whilst listening to music or editing an online document whilst talking to a colleague on the 
phone. In order to assess the effect of media multitasking on cognition, Ophir et al (2009) divided 
subjects into two groups: heavy and light media multitaskers. They then assessed the performance 
of the two groups on a variety of tasks intended to index cognitive control capabilities. Their results 
showed that heavy media multitaskers exhibit a number of changes in cognitive control functioning 
relative to light media multitaskers. In general, heavy media multitaskers are more susceptible to 
interference from irrelevant stimuli, and they thus seem to possess a tendency for bottom-up, as 




“The present data suggest that LMMs *low media multitaskers+ have a greater 
tendency for top-down attentional control, and thus they may find it easier to 
attentionally focus on a single task in the face of distractions. By contrast, HMMs 
[high media multitaskers] are more likely to respond to stimuli outside the realm 
of their immediate task, and thus may have a greater tendency for bottom-up 
attentional control” (Ophir et al., 2009) 
Of course, the method used by Ophir et al (2009) to distinguish between heavy and light media 
multitaskers  is  not  one  that  specifically  targets  the  degree  of  Web  usage.  In  fact,  it  is  entirely 
possible that none of the heavy media multitaskers were Web users. The results are interesting, 
however, because they suggest that the heavy use of contemporary communications and media 
technology  can  (potentially
5)  induce  relatively enduring  changes in information processing ; i.e. 
changes that extend beyond a particular usage context. Given that cognitive control is implicated in 
our ability  to  appropriately allocate  our attention to a task , maintain information in working 
memory, and control our responses to task-relevant (as well as task-irrelevant) information, it seems 
that Carr might be onto something when he suggests that some of us are suffering from  a form of 
technology-induced attention deficit disorder. What is not clear, however, is whether these changes 
stem from our specific use of the Web, or whether they simply reflect a cognitive response to the 
multimedia medley of the modern world
6. 
If our exposure to the Web  is contributing to changes in cognitive control  functions, then such 
changes could be revealed by studies examining the neuroanatomical structures implicated in such 
functions. The brain structure that has been most  commonly implicated  in cognitive control  (or 
executive functioning) is the prefrontal cortex (e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Roberts et al., 1998) . At 
least one study has indicated that  the performance of a common Web-based activity, namely Web 
searching, is associated with changes in this region (Small et al., 2009). This study used the technique 
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the brains of subjects who were either 
experienced or inexperienced Web users. Measurements of brain activity were taken while subjects 
were engaged in a simulated version of a Web searching task and while they were engaged in  
reading a conventional text. The results revealed a significant difference in baseline activity between 
the brains of experienced and inexperienced Web users  while  they were  engaged in the Web 
searching task but not while they were engaged in the reading task. In particular, e xperienced Web 
users showed a much greater activation of frontal cortical structures, relative to the inexperienced 
users. Interestingly,  this difference was eliminated in a subsequent scan after the inexperienced 
subjects had been asked to engage in Web searching behaviour for a limited period of time  (see 
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functions may simply be more inclined, for whatever reason, to become heavy media multitaskers. As such, it 
is not clear that the concurrent processing of multiple media streams is the thing that actually causes the shift 
to breadth-based cognitive control strategies. 
6 Inasmuch as it is the exposure to multiple, distinct streams of information content that is actually causing the 
changes observed by Ophir et al (2009), it may be that our exposure to the Web is, by itself, sufficient to cause 
changes in executive functioning. This is because many Web pages feature multiple types of media (video, 
images, text, audio), and, at least o ccasionally, these media streams communicate semantically -distinct 
information. A news site, for example, may display live video, scrolling stock quotes, live sports scores and 
adverts, while the average Facebook page is a veritable smorgasbord of semantic ally-distinct information 
content. In our efforts to deal with these multiple media streams, we may be engaging in a form of Web-based 




Small & Vorgan, 2008). After just five days of Web searching experience, the brains of inexperienced 
Web users resembled those of their more experienced counterparts (see Small & Vorgan, 2008).  
In the absence of controlled behavioural studies, it is difficult to know whether the results of Small 
et al (2009) tell us anything significant about the effects of the Web on cognitive functioning. While 
the frontal cortex has been implicated in cognitive control functions, it is difficult to know exactly 
what an increase in its activity actually represents. In general, higher levels of prefrontal cortical 
activation are seen on tasks typically requiring  executive functioning (e.g. Koechlin et al., 2003; 
Newman et al., 2003), and so it is not easy to argue that a profile of heightened activity necessarily 
reflects a deficit in cognitive control. Small and Vorgan (2008) recognize this possibility. They suggest 
that: 
“...Googling  or  other  technological  experiences  does  sharpen  some  cognitive 
abilities. We can learn to react more quickly to visual stimuli and improve many 
forms  of  attention,  particularly  the  ability  to  notice  images  in  our  peripheral 
vision. We develop a better ability to sift through large amounts of information 
rapidly and decide what is important and what isn’t...” (pg. 49) 
The results are also difficult to interpret in terms of the possibility of enduring changes in cognitive 
functioning that extend beyond the specific use of the Web. The fact that neither group seemed to 
show differential activity on the reading control task suggests that the changes in brain function 
were relatively specific to the Web searching task. If this is the case, the results of Small et al (2009) 
may reflect the adaptation of the brain to some of the task demands associated with the retrieval of 
online content.  
To summarise, the available scientific evidence suggests that certain features of the Web may affect 
cognitive processing. In particular, the presence of hyperlinks, and the navigational capabilities they 
support, may interfere with our ability to recall information and develop a deep understanding of 
information content. However, there is no direct evidence  to support the idea that the Web is 
contributing to long-lasting changes in cognitive function. There is some evidence to suggest that our 
attempt to process information from multiple media streams may be associated with changes in 
executive functioning (Ophir et al., 2009). However, such evidence is not necessarily the result of 
Web use, and there is insufficient evidence to discern the direction of causality. The neuroimaging 
studies of Small et al (2009) suggest that frequent Web use may be linked to changes in brain 
function; however, the cognitive significance of such changes is currently unclear. In addition, the 
similarity in brain activity profiles of both experienced and inexperienced Web users on a reading 
control task is not consistent with Carr’s claim that the Web is contributing to profound changes in 
general reading processes.  
Changing the Way We Think? 
The question of whether the Web is producing cognitive change is a question that has attracted 
considerable  recent  media  attention  and  intellectual  debate.  In  addition  to  a  continuing 
commentary in the British media
7, the cognitive implications of Internet access were the focus of the 
2010  Edge Foundation  Annual Question.  In  response to the  question  “HOW  IS  THE  INTERNET 
                                                           
7 See, for example, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/aug/15/internet-brain-neuroscience-debate 




CHANGING THE WAY YOU THINK?” a variety of commentators, ranging from scientists, philosophers, 
journalists, historians and technologists, offered their views as to how they thought the Internet was 
affecting human cognition
8. Most of these views recognized the potential of the Internet to effect 
profound shifts in our cognitive abilities.  
In this section, I want to highlight a number of issues that I believe are important to consider in 
answering questions about the cognitive impact of the Web. Ultimately, the nature of the cognitive 
changes produced by the Web will only be uncovered by empirical research, but in undertaking this 
research it is important to have a clear understanding of a host of additional issues. Most of the se 
issues are tied up with  the notion of what is meant by the term  ‘cognitive change’ (for example, 
what counts as a genuine shift in our cognitive profile, relative to our current modes of cognitive 
processing?). It is also important to understand what is meant by the notion of the ‘Web’. Many of 
the critical commentaries that have highlighted the putative hazards or shortcomings of the Web 
(Carr, 2010; Dreyfus, 2009) have tended to adopt a particular view of what the Web is. This view is 
dominated by our conventional modes of interaction with the Web – the use of browser-based 
forms  of  information  access  and  the  use  of  document-  or  page-centric  modes  of  information 
representation  and  display.  But  why  assume  that  our  currently  popular  modes  of  Web-based 
interaction, and the technologies that support it, necessarily exhaust the range of possibilities when 
it comes to productive forms of cognitive engagement with the online world? The Web is something 
of a protean beast when it comes to user interaction and information access capabilities. New forms 
of  information  representation,  new  forms  of  user  interaction  technology,  and  new  forms  of 
application development all contribute to an ever-changing landscape against which our notions of 
the cognitive impact of the Web are always likely to be somewhat ephemeral. 
What is the way we think? 
Before we can conclude anything about the cognitive effects of the Web, or the Internet more 
generally, we need to understand something about the actual nature of human cognitive processing. 
This is important because it is easy to assume that the Web causes us to depart from a form of 
cognitive processing that is, in fact, largely uncharacteristic of the way cognition actually occurs in 
real-world  situations.  We  might  thus  be  tempted  to  assume  that  the  standard  form  of  human 
cognition is one of environmental detachment and inner contemplation – one in which the human 
thinker  maintains  a  sustained  focus  on  an  internally-generated  sequence  of  reason-respecting 
thoughts until some kind of cognitive outcome is achieved. This is the image that perhaps best 
captures our notions of what it means to think deeply about something, and it is the kind of image 
that is perhaps most vulnerable to the Web’s influence. Rather than promoting our capacity for 
quiet contemplation and inner reflection, the Web seems to demand constant engagement with 
external  sources of  information.  And  rather  than  our  thoughts  being  driven  by  association  and 
reason, the Web encourages us to think in much the same as way we surf it: in a series of saccadic 
leaps between semantically-related (and sometimes not so semantically-related) resources. As we 
browse the Web, the sequential structure of our thinking becomes driven more by the lure of the 
links we see and less by the character of our thoughts themselves – our thoughts tend to follow the 
content of the links we click! Perhaps it is this fear of what the Web can do to our ability to think – 
our ability to engage in prolonged periods of environmentally-detached inner contemplation – that 
most fuels our fears about the cognitive implications of Web access. But the fear is justified only to 
                                                           




the  extent  that  the  ‘Rodinesque’  image  of  human cognition  –  our  image of  human  thinking  as 
consisting in episodes of environmentally-decoupled reason and linear thought – is basically correct. 
If an alternative, more active and environmentally-engaged, model of human cognition could be 
advanced, the influence of the Web might not seem so malign. 
The  alternative  image  comes  in  the  form  of  situated,  distributed  and  embodied  approaches  to 
human cognition (Clark, 1999, 2008; Haugeland, 1998; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 2009; Menary, 2010; 
Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007; Robbins & Ayded, 2009). These approaches have encouraged us to think 
about the way in which much of our cognitive success may be grounded in processing loops that 
factor in the contributions of our extra-neural social and technological environments. Consider the 
case of multiplying two three-digit numbers. One account of how we are able to multiply the two 
numbers might emphasize how we first derive some symbolic encoding of the visual (or auditory) 
input corresponding to the two numbers. It would then invoke a computational account according to 
which the inner symbols are manipulated in some way so as to achieve the correct mathematical 
outcome. Now contrast this with what is surely a more accurate (and ecologically-realistic) picture of 
how we implement long multiplication in the real-world. This alternative picture involves the active 
manipulation of external symbols in such a way that the kind of problem confronting the biological 
brain is profoundly simplified. In place of purely inner, environmentally-decoupled, computational 
operations we see a pattern of real world-involving perception-action cycles – ones in which single 
digit  numbers  are  compared  and  intermediate  computational  results  are  stored  in  an  external 
medium using (e.g.) pen and paper. This example, described in Wilson and Clark (2009), is a case of 
what we might call environmentally-extended cognition or cognitive extension (see also Clark, 2008). 
It takes what is, ostensibly, an inner cognitive capability (an ability to do long multiplication) and 
shows how crucial aspects of the problem-solving process can be (and usually are) delegated to 
aspects of the external world.  
Another example of the way in which cognitive success may be predicated on our ability to actively 
engage with aspects of the external environment is the process of writing an academic paper or 
report. One view as to how we generate such artefacts might emphasize the role of purely inner 
resources in contributing to fully-formed thoughts, which are then serialized as words on paper. But 
this is seldom, if ever, how real academic texts get written. For better or worse, what generally tends 
to happen is that we start by writing down a few fragmentary thoughts and ideas, and these then 
prompt further thoughts and ideas. As the paper emerges, a variety of external resources, such as 
text and papers, often themselves heavily annotated with notes and  marginalia, are continually 
consulted. As Clark (1997) argues: 
“*the text+ does not spring fully formed from inner cogitations. Instead, it is the 
product of a sustained and iterated sequence of interactions between my brain 
and a variety of external props. In these cases, I am willing to say, a good deal of 
actual thinking involves loops and circuits that run outside the head and through 
the local environment. Extended intellectual arguments and theses are almost 
always the products of brains acting in concert with multiple external resources. 
These resources enable us to pursue manipulations and juxtapositions of ideas 




What situated, distributed and embodied approaches to cognition provide, then, is an alternative 
image of human cognition. In place of the conventional image of the environmentally-detached 
human  thinker,  the  alternative  image  emphasizes  the  role  played  by material  embodiment  and 
environmental embedding. Instead of cognitive success always being the product of inner reflection 
and quiet contemplation, we are afforded an image in which active engagement and interaction with 
the external environment plays an important role in at least some aspects of our daily cognitive 
activity. Obviously, there is no question here about our ability to actually engage in episodes of 
environmentally-decoupled reflection. We can, and clearly do, resort to this way of thinking on at 
least some occasions. The real issue is the extent to which this mode of thinking typifies much of our 
everyday cognition, and the extent to which we always need to engage in this kind of thinking in 
order to ensure cognitive success. If, as is suggested by theorists such as Clark (2008), our cognitive 
achievements are often reliant on forms of biotechnological and socio-cultural scaffolding, then we 
need to take this alternative view into account whenever we formulate responses to the question of 
whether the Web is changing the way we think. This is because the disruptive potential of the Web 
may seem greater (and far more injurious) to some forms of human thinking compared to others. If, 
for example, you subscribe to the view that human thinking is typified by quiet contemplation and 
sustained attention to a sequence of internally-generated thoughts, then the transition to a state-of-
affairs in which human problem solving is dominated by extended bouts of active engagement with 
a  set  of  external  resources  will  seem  like  a  turn  for  the  worse.  If,  however,  you  view  human 
cognition as something that characteristically involves the active recruitment of external resources 
into complex webs of extra-neural processing, then you will see the Web as simply providing the 
basis  for  additional  forms  of  environmentally-situated  cognitive  processing.  Importantly,  our 
preconceptions about the nature of human cognitive processing – whether they have an internalist 
or externalist focus – are likely to guide our intuitions about the kind of cognitive change we see the 
Web producing and whether we see such changes as being, in general, a boon or a burden. If an 
ability for inner reflection is seen as the critical feature of our cognitive profile, and the mainstay of 
our intellectual and cognitive accomplishments, then the Web will be seen as, at best, influencing 
the kind of things we think about; i.e. the contents of our cognition. This may or may not yield 
cognitive advantages. However, in general, advocates of this view will be highly circumspect about 
the cognitive impact of the Web. They will tend to see extended periods of interaction with the Web 
as detracting from our opportunity to engage in ‘real’ thought, and they will regard any apparent 
deterioration  in  our  ability  to  engage  in  environmentally-detached  inner  reflection  as  a  sign  of 
cognitive pathology. In particular, they are likely to regard anything that promotes a ‘premature’ 
curtailment of inner-directed thought as something that is potentially damaging to our cognitive 
capabilities. Instead of seeing the delicate inter-leaving of both inner- and outer-directed forms of 
attentional focus as a legitimate expression of at least some forms of continuous cognitive activity, 
they will tend to see any form of attention to external stimuli as reflecting a breakdown in cognition 
– as reflecting the harmful and unwanted intrusion of the external world into the inner sanctum of 
human thought and reason. In contrast to this view, advocates of more situated approaches to 
cognition are less likely to see our active engagement with the Web as merely providing the stuff of 
thought – the contents of cognition. For them, the Web may also play a role in shaping the process 
of thought – the mechanisms of cognition. This is an important shift in perspective, and it influences 




The main point of this discussion is to show that the responses we might have to the question of 
whether the Web is changing the way we think is, in part, dictated by the kind of assumptions we 
make about the nature of human cognition. If we want to understand the cognitive effects of the 
Web, then we need to understand something about the actual nature of human cognition. We also 
need  to  be  explicit  about  the  kind  of  assumptions  we  are  making  regarding  the  potential  for 
environmentally-extended forms of cognitive processing. To an “externalist” – one who adopts a 
situated, distributed or extended mind perspective – the cognitive effects of the Web will depend on 
the details of the informational contact the user is able to establish with Web-accessible resources. 
To an “internalist”, the cognitive effects of the Web will be limited to whatever changes are seen in 
our capacity for environmentally-detached inner reflection and our ability to follow linear trains of 
thought.  
When does a change in cognitive performance matter? 
Whether or not we agree with the statement that the Web is changing the way we think, this says 
very little about the actual impact of the Web on our cognitive performance. A change in the way we 
think could be for the better or for the worse. Perhaps this is the most pressing issue in terms of the 
cognitive effects of the Web. The Web may be changing the way we think, but it is really the effect 
of the Web on our cognitive performance that is at the heart of our worries, hopes and fears. 
One would think that it would be relatively easy to measure the effect of the Web in terms of our 
cognitive capabilities. We could, for example, take a sample of experienced and inexperienced Web 
users and subject them to a variety of cognitive tests, such as the tests of cognitive control employed 
by Ophir et al (2009). There is certainly some interest in running tests of this kind, although it is not 
entirely  clear  what  such  results  by  themselves  will tell  us  about the  causal  role of the Web  in 
effecting cognitive change. Another problem stems from the discussion in the previous section. If we 
accept that our contact with the Web may occasionally give rise to extended cognitive systems – 
systems in which cognitive processing is distributed across brain, body and world – then it becomes 
far more difficult to gauge the actual cognitive costs and benefits of Web access. The main problem 
here is that the cognitive profile of the socially- and technologically-integrated agent need not be 
that of the agent who is decoupled from her socio-technical surrounds. When an extended cognitive 
system emerges, the human agent forms an integrated system with some aspect of the external 
technological or informational environment, and the cognitive properties of that system are not 
necessarily  those  of  the  environmentally-decoupled  agent.  In  most  cases,  the  kind  of  cognitive 
achievements that are possible when the human agent is actively coupled with a technology are not 
necessarily possible when that agent is tested in isolation. To exemplify this, think of the cases of 
long  multiplication  and  academic  paper  writing  mentioned  previously.  If  we  remove  the 
technological  scaffolds  of  pen  and  paper,  the  human  agent  may  find  herself  struggling  to 
demonstrate the same kind of mathematical and literary competence as was possible when such 
resources were readily available. Now suppose that over the course of extensive use with pen and 
paper,  the  performance  profile  of  the  basic  biological  agent  deteriorates.  Perhaps  the  agent 
becomes so accustomed to using the external resources that she is no longer able to rely on the 
capacities of her bare biological brain. Should we say in these cases that the technological scaffolds 
have  exerted  a  negative  influence,  that  they  have undermined  the  cognitive  capabilities  of  the 
human subject, and that the use of such resources should be limited on the grounds that they are 
harmful to our cognitive well-being? This conclusion only seems to be warranted if we can convince 




biologically-bounded, brain-based achievements. To some of us, however, this conclusion does not 
seem entirely plausible. It may be that prolonged use of a technology produces changes in brain-
based bio-cognitive functioning, but to say that the technology is thus exerting a negative impact on 
cognition depends very much on whether one accepts that the performance of the technology-
wielding agent should  not count as part of that agent’s cognitive profile.  To an extended mind 
theorist  –  one  who  accepts  the  possibility  of  environmentally-extended  forms  of  cognitive 
processing  –  the  performance  of  a  properly  integrated  biotechnological  system  (comprising, 
perhaps, human agent and Web technologies) is a legitimate part of the cognitive profile of an 
agent. To such a theorist, the decision about the positive or negative contributions of a technology 
to our overall cognitive health will depend less on the details of bio-cognitive processing and more 
on the details of the bio-technological coupling (for example, whether the technology is always 
available  to  influence  thought  and  action  in  cognitively-productive ways).  In  this  case,  it  seems 
perfectly possible for a technology to make a net positive contribution to cognitive performance, in 
spite of a possible degradation in brain-based bio-cognitive capabilities, providing that the following 
conditions are met: 
1.  the technology does actually improve performance when it is being used (in particular, it 
supports  levels  of  performance  that  would  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  attain  if  the 
individual was to rely on the operation of the bare biological brain); 
2.  the technology is readily available (in particular, the technology is always at hand whenever 
it is needed); 
3.  the technology is highly reliable (i.e. it generally performs as it is supposed to, certainly to a 
level that promotes trust in whatever outcomes it delivers); and 
4.  the technology does not negatively affect our ability to engage in other forms of cognitive 
extension (if the cognitive changes introduced by one technology interfere with the use of 
other technologies, then this may be a cause for concern). 
Providing these conditions are met, we should not, I think, be overly alarmed by technology-induced 
changes in our bio-cognitive capabilities. What matters when it comes to human cognition is that we 
are able to engineer our technological environments in ways that alleviate much of the processing 
burden on the biological brain. As Clark (1997) comments, “Our brains make the world smart so that 
we can be dumb in peace” (pg. 180).  
How significant are changes in brain function? 
At first blush, the finding that exposure to the Web can cause apparent changes in brain activity (see 
Small et al., 2009) seems to provide compelling evidence of the Web’s potential to alter cognitive 
functioning. The brain is, after all, the material substrate on which all the various elements of mind 
and cognition seem to depend, and it seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that changes in the 
activity of the brain will result in a change in at least some aspect of our minds. Before we become 
overly enamoured with the results of brain imaging studies, however, we need to be clear what is 
and what is not revealed by such studies. For a start, it is not clear that all changes in neural activity 
are necessarily relevant to human cognition, or at least to the dimensions of human cognition in 
which we are interested. Given what we know about the neuroscience of human cognition, it seems 
likely that changes in higher brain regions (i.e. forebrain and midbrain structures) are more likely to 
affect cognitive performance as compared to lower brain regions. However, even if we do detect 




whether this reflects a fundamental change in some aspect of our cognitive profile, or whether it 
simply reflects the adaptation of the neural system to some new technology-using context. If, as was 
mentioned  above,  the  brain  is  but  one  element  of  an  environmentally-extended  nexus  of 
cognitively-relevant  resources,  then  it  seems  likely  that  we  will  encounter  changes  in  neural 
processing whenever we situate the brain within a new technological context. This change need not 
necessarily  indicate  any  deterioration  in  cognitive  performance;  rather,  the  change  may  simply 
reflect the accommodation of some new external resource into an extended cognitive circuit – a 
case, perhaps, of the brain adapting its activity to best suit the features of the new cognitive niche in 
which it finds itself. Of course, any situation that involves interaction with a new resource is likely to 
introduce at least some changes in neural processing simply because new technologies often require 
the acquisition of new skills. The brain of someone who has never previously encountered a mouse 
and keyboard may need to incorporate a number of adjustments before skilful interaction with the 
Web can take place
9. Similarly, we may expect to observe changes in neural functioning as a person 
evolves from a novice chess player   into a chess grand master. Whether such changes reliably 
indicate a change in cognitive functioning is a moot poin t; however, they do not, by themselves, 
indicate that the cognitive potential of the human agent is either enhanced or undermined  as a 
result of using a new technology.  
The problem with brain imaging studies, like that of Small et al  (2009), is that they actually tell us 
very little about the way in which a new technology is affecting cognitive processing,  particularly if 
we embrace the notions of distributed, situated and extended cognition outlined above. Suppose we 
do observe a change in some aspect of neural functioning. Does this change indicate a fundamental 
shift in the way cognitive processing is performed? This seems likely only if we accept that all aspects 
of our cognitive profile are neurally-realized. If this is not the case, perhaps because some aspects of 
our cognitive processing are realized by environmentally-extended circuits, then it is possible that 
the same basic cognitive process is being implemented  the same  as before,  just using different 
mechanisms (i.e. the mechanistic realization of the  process has changed, but the nature of the  
process itself remains unchanged). On the other hand, suppose we fail to observe a change in neural 
functioning. Does this indicate that cognition is unaffected by the introduction of a new technology? 
Again, this only seems to be the case if we accept that all that matters to mind and cognition is what 
happens in the brain. If we accept the possibility that the machinery of mind and cognition extend 
beyond the traditional borders of skin an d skull, then it seems that cognitive functioning could be 
radically altered by the ways in which specific aspects of the external environment are recruited as 
part of an environmentally-extended cognitive process, independently of whatever happens in the 
brain. As Clark
10 comments: 
“Suppose we convince ourselves, by whatever means, that as far as the basic 
mode  of  operation  of  the  brain  goes,  Internet  experience  is  not  altering  it 
[cognition] one whit. That supports a negative answer only if we assume that the 
routines that fix the 'nature of human thinking' must be thoroughly biological: 
                                                           
9 Of course, it is difficult to know to what extent a lot of the research findings relating to Web-based changes in 
neurological or cognitive functioning are attributable to the kinds of user interaction technologies we rely on 
to access Web content. Conventional modes of Web access do not necessarily exhaust the range of potential 
interaction  opportunities  that  future  technological  developments  could  bring  (see  below),  and  this  has 
significant implications for how we think about the potential or actual cognitive effects of the Web. 




that they must be routines running within, and only within, the individual human 
brain. But surely it is this assumption that our experiences with the Internet (and 
with  other  'intelligence  amplifiers'  before  it)  most  clearly  calls  into  question. 
Perhaps the Internet is changing the 'way we think' by changing the circuits that 
get  to  implement  some  aspects  of  human  thinking,  providing  some  hybrid 
(biological and non-biological) circuitry for thought itself.” 
The importance of brain imaging studies, such as those of Small et al (2009), are therefore difficult to 
assess in terms of their relevance to Web-induced changes in cognitive functioning. Such studies 
only really become of interest once we are able to detect a change in cognitive performance and are 
then able to relate the changes to changes in neural processing. Even in this case, however, it is 
often unclear whether the observed changes constitute a cause for concern for the reasons outlined 
in the previous section (see ‘When does a change in cognitive performance matter?’).  
What do we mean by the ‘Web’? 
Suppose we accept the view that the Web is influencing cognition, and that, in general, the nature of 
the influence is negative. Perhaps we can assume that the worries and concerns expressed by Carr 
are indeed correct and that the Web is exerting a largely malign influence on our ability to think, 
read and remember. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we also discover that the effects of the 
Web on our offline, bio-cognitive capabilities (i.e. the capabilities supported by the bare biological 
brain) are not compensated for by an overall improvement in our online, bio-technologically hybrid 
performance. Does this putative state-of-affairs mean that the Web is generally bad for our overall 
cognitive well-being?  
In answering this question, I think it helps to pay attention to yet another question: what exactly do 
we mean by the ‘Web’? The fact is that many people’s concept of the Web is governed by their 
experiences  with  a  particular  set  of  technologies,  namely  HTML  Web  pages  and  Web  browser 
technologies. There is nothing wrong with this view. Most of our interaction with the Web is based 
on the use of precisely these technologies. It is mistake, however, to assume that these kinds of 
technologies, and the interactive capabilities they support, exhaust the potential opportunities for 
the Web to exert some sort of cognitive influence (either positive or negative). This is why we should 
be cautious of blanket statements that either praise or pillory the Web on cognitive grounds. The 
current set of technologies we associate with the Web may yield a particular set of cognitive vices 
and  virtues,  but  these  do  not  necessarily  speak  to  the  cognitive  impacts  of  future  Web-based 
technologies. Later in the paper, we will encounter discussions of linked data (Bizer et al., 2009) and 
augmented reality, both of which provide alternative visions of what the Web is and the kind of 
capabilities it might support. The cognitive impact of such technologies may be either positive or 
negative; however, what is important for present purposes is simply that we should not be misled 
into thinking that a particular view of the Web (e.g. as browser-based access to HTML resources) 
necessarily  exhausts  the  space  of  possibilities  concerning  future  forms  of  Web-based  cognitive 
change. 
Extending the Mind: Cognitive Extension and the Future Web 
The Web is a technology that is transforming many aspects of our lives, and if we are to believe the 
views of people like Carr, this transformative influence may very well extend to aspects of the 




form, are probably quite limited. True, some aspects of our cognitive profile may be enhanced or 
undermined as a result of Web access, but, in general, I suspect the Web is not causing any major 
shift in our cognitive power and potential. At least there is little hard evidence available at the 
present time to warrant such a conclusion. 
This is not to say that the Web does not have the potential to effect major cognitive change. The 
Web is, I think, a technology that opens up all kind of opportunities for cognitive transformation. The 
realization of these transformative opportunities requires, I suspect, a significant change in the way 
we access online information. In particular, I think we need to move  away from our traditional 
notions  of  Web-based  information  access  and  embrace  an  alternative  vision  of  the  Web.  This 
alternative vision does not necessarily dispense with our familiar ways of interacting with the Web – 
the use of Web browsers, HTML documents and so on – but it does introduce a range of new 
interactive opportunities and possibilities, all of which are supported by a host of technological 
innovations.  
My aim in this section is to sketch out this alternative vision of the Web and show why it is better 
placed to influence human cognition. The technological innovations that feature as part of this vision 
are those that I think are most likely to enable future forms of Web-based cognitive extension; i.e. 
the creation of extended cognitive systems comprising human agents, Web-accessible information 
resources  and  Web-enabled  technological  devices.  In  general,  however,  these  technological 
innovations do not require any radical shifts in our current engineering capabilities, and, in many 
cases, early forms of the technologies are already beginning to appear. The vision of the future Web 
that emerges on the back of these technologies is a Web that is more suitable for participation in 
cognitively-potent biotechnological mergers. The new technologies will affect our access to online 
information in precisely those ways that are required for the emergence of extended cognitive 
systems, and the result will be a Web that is fundamentally more likely to transform our cognitive 
and epistemic profiles. 
Writing and Thinking 
In order to understand something about the transformative potential of a technology, it helps to 
focus on a specific example. Writing is a good example here because it involves the use of specific 
props,  aids  and  artefacts  to  supplement  our  biologically-based  modes  of  information  storage, 
manipulation and retrieval. The invention of writing also arguably produced profound shifts in our 
cognitive power and potential. In particular, the invention of writing caused a significant change in 
the way we structured our intellectual activities, both individually and collectively. Writing enabled 
us to serialize our thoughts to an external medium and then revisit those thoughts at different times 
in different contexts
11. Such modes of external storage also facilitated the spread of thoughts and 
ideas. They enabled the ideas of one person to influence  the thoughts of many others. Of all the 
                                                           
11 An important aspect of writing is that it enables us to revisit our thoughts at different points in time. Thus, 
we can approach our thoughts and ideas while in different mental (both cognitive and emotional) states and 
frames of mind. This is important because the kinds of experiences we have between the initial serialization of 
a thought and the subsequent reinstatement of that thought might enable us to form associations and insights 
that were simply impossible when we first had the thought. By revisiting our own thoughts (and indeed those 
of others) in different contexts, we can press maximum cognitive potential from those thoughts. Thoughts that 
failed to inspire productive shifts in our thinking at one point in time, can suddenly, by virtue of the new 




technological innovations that have had an influence on the way we think, none has perhaps been 
more profound than the development of writing. 
As with any transformative technology, writing has had its fair share of critics. In Plato’s Phaedrus, 
for example, Socrates expresses his concerns about the invention of writing:  
“If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to 
exercise memory  because  they rely  on that which  is  written,  calling  things to 
remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. 
What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. And it is 
no true wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling 
them of many things without teaching them you will make them seem to know 
much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not with 
wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows.” 
(Hackworth, 1952; pg. 157) 
Socrates’ concerns about the use of writing to unburden our memories may, to some extent, have 
been  well-founded.  We  clearly  do  rely  on  the  external  storage  of  information  to  support  and 
(perhaps supplant) our bio-memory capabilities. However, concerns about the broader implications 
of writing on our cognitive capabilities do not seem particularly valid. Our intellectual heritage owes 
much to the invention of writing, and few, I suspect, would now advocate the abandonment of 
writing as a means to enhance our cognitive functioning. Even if it could be shown that writing has 
undermined our bio-memory capabilities, it seems unlikely that we would regard ourselves as better 
off, in a cognitive sense, if we were suddenly obliged to abandon writing and return to biologically-
based modes of information storage and recall. 
There are two reasons, I think, why Socrates’ concerns about writing seem misguided, and both of 
these reasons touch on issues relevant to cognitive extension. The first reason relates to the easy 
availability, reliability and usability of writing technology. These factors, coupled with our ability to 
use writing technology effectively (an ability acquired though many years of formal instruction and 
education), means that we now regard our cognitive profile as simply a composite of whatever 
abilities are bestowed on us by both our biological brains and our ability to create, manipulate and 
exploit the written word. Whenever technologies become as readily available, as reliable, and as 
easy to use as most writing technologies, they promote forms of cognitive extension in which the 
cognitive abilities of the larger system (in the case of writing, the system comprising human agent, 
writing utensils and durable storage media) are simply seen as the cognitive abilities of the human 
agent. In such situations, we become so bonded with our technologies that they become a part of 
who we are as cognitive agents. The cognitive abilities of the brain, working in concert with the 
external technology, are seen as just as much a part of the cognitive agent as the cognitive abilities 
produced by the inter-operation of (e.g.) the hippocampus and hypothalamus. Just as it would not 
make much sense to say that our cognitive abilities are those of the hippocampus or frontal lobes 
minus whatever contributions are made by the hypothalamus, it does not make much sense to say 
(in  some  situations  at  least)  that  our  cognitive  profile  is  based  solely  on  the  operation  of  the 
biological brain minus a specific technology. In cases where a technology is readily available, and its 
use has become almost automatic for the human user (in the words of Clark (2007), it has become 




engendered by the larger environmentally-extended cognitive systems in which much of our real 
world cognitive processing takes place.  
A second reason why I think Socrates’ views about writing fail to strike a chord with us is because his 
concerns centre on one specific aspect of writing, namely the use of writing technology to support 
the  external  storage  of  information.  This  is  undoubtedly  an  important  aspect  of  our  writing 
capabilities, but it ignores the other kinds of roles that writing may play in supporting our thought 
processes. In particular, the storage-based view of writing fails to appreciate the active role played 
by the outputs of our writing in the driving of our thoughts. If we think of writing as merely the 
external storage of facts that can be reloaded into consciousness whenever the need takes us, then 
perhaps not much is gained in a cognitive sense. We simply alleviate our brains of some of their 
memory burden by offloading storage functions onto the external world. In general, however, the 
products of our writing activity fulfil more than this simple offloading function. They do not simply 
reinstate thoughts we once had. They also structure, constrain and influence our thinking processes. 
Recall the case of academic paper writing discussed earlier in this paper. What we see in the case of 
academic paper writing is a temporally fine-tuned interaction between the biological brain and a set 
of external resources, both of which influence one another in the form of a closed-loop feedback 
system. The brain generates some initial ideas which, when serialized to some bio-external media, 
serve as the trigger for additional (neurally-realized) thoughts and ideas.  We don’t just use the 
process  of  writing  as  a  means  of  recording  our  thoughts  and  ideas.  The  writing  process  itself 
contributes  to  the  kind  of  thoughts  and  ideas  we  have.  In  general,  when  we  think  about  the 
cognitive impacts of writing (or of any cognitive technology), we should not be limited to thinking 
about the role played by writing in the long-term storage of the products of our thinking (what we 
might call its long-term memory function). We should also think about the active role of writing in 
driving the thinking process itself: in supporting the production of thoughts as well as their long-
term storage
12. 
The potential role played by  writing in  the forming of our thoughts has been appreciated by a 
number of theorists. In the introduction to his book entitled ‘Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, 
Action  and  Cognitive  Extension’,  Clark  (2008)  recounts  an  exchange  between  the  Nobel  Prize-
winning physicist Richard Feynman and the historian Charles Weiner in which Feynman argues for 
the importance of his notes in contributing to his thoughts. Rather than representing a mere record 
of his internal cogitation, Feynman seems to be arguing that the process of creating the notes and 
sketches is part of the cognitive work itself. Such notions are highly compatible with the notion of 
cognitive extension, and Clark (2008) goes on to suggest that the cycle of information flow and 
influence established by Feynman and his notepad plays a crucial role in the realization of Feynman’s 
thinking: 
“...I would like to go further and suggest that Feynman was actually thinking on 
the paper. The loop through pen and paper is part of the physical machinery 
                                                           
12  There  is  an  issue  here  concerning  the  impact  that  different  forms  of  writing  technology  have  on  our 
cognition. We can thus think about the differences in writing ability enabled by the skilled use of a keyboard 
compared to conventional pen and paper. The temporal profile of each is very different. Keyboards enable us 
to serialize our thoughts much more quickly (in some cases) than conventional writing utensils. Whether this 
difference  in  temporal  profile  actually  helps  or  hinders  us  in  terms  of  our  literary  accomplishments  is 




responsible  for  the  shape  and  flow  of  thoughts  and  ideas  that  we  take, 
nonetheless, to be distinctively those of Richard Feynman.” (pg. xxv) 
What Clark is basically suggesting here is that writing is constitutive of thinking: that writing plays an 
active role in the realization of our thoughts, and that the machinery of cognition (at least in this 
particular case) extends to include not just the biological brain, but also the elements of the bio-
external  environment  that  make  the  creation  of  symbolic  artefacts  (written  words)  possible
13. 
Thinking, from this point of view, is not something that occurs solely within the head . It is also 
something that can be spread across a variety of extra -neural and extra -corporeal resources. 
Thinking, as with other types of cognitive processing, is sometimes literally extended into the world 
outside the head. 
What writing gives us, then, is a range of opportunities for cognitive extension that fundamentally 
transform the kinds of things of which we are capable, both at an individual and collective level. We 
do not need to fear the cognitive imp lications of writing technology; for even if it could be shown 
that some aspects of our bio-cognitive performance profile are negatively affected by our ability to 
write, it would still be the case tha t writing earns its cognitive keep in terms of the net benefits it 
brings us (both individually and collectively). What makes writing a force for good is  not just that it 
facilitates our thinking during those times in which we are actually coupled to our writing-related 
artefacts (although this is undoubtedly important); it is also that the technologies we use for writing 
are so readily and reliably available. In the case of writing, we do not distinguish between the 
cognitive capabilities of the  technologically-isolated human agent and the cognitive capabilities of 
the larger biotechnological system (comprising human agent and writing technologies). Instead, we 
simply see the cognitive capabilities of the human agent as those of the larger system. The cognitive 
profile of the larger biotechnological system is essentially incorporated into our cognitive schema – 
our sense of who and what we are as cognitive agents. And what makes this kind of cognitive 
incorporation plausible, on subjective, social and (possibly) scientific grounds, is the way in which 
writing technologies are poised to help us in our everyday cognitive affairs – whenever we need 
their help, they are always there, ready to assist us. 
The Making of an Extended Mind 
These days we can feel secure in the cognitive rewards writing gives us. But it wasn’t always so – 
particularly in Socrates’ time. The fact is that almost all forms of technologically-based cognitive 
extension  require  a  prolonged  period  of  technological,  sociological  and  even  neurological 
adaptation. In the case of writing, the features that make writing technologies so apt to participate 
in extended cognitive systems have come at the end of a long sequence of technological innovation 
and  social  change.  The  widespread  availability  of  pen  and  paper,  for  example,  did  not  happen 
overnight. It took many years before these resources were available in sufficient quantity for them 
to become a standard part of our everyday lives – part of the persisting backdrop against which our 
cognitive schema emerges. And although technological innovation and adoption are clearly a major 
part of the story, they are not the only things that need to be considered. We are not born skilled 
writers, capable of wielding a pen or working a keyboard. Rather, our writing abilities emerge over 
                                                           
13 Clark is apparently not alone in highlighting the potential constitutive role played by writing. Something 
similar is, in fact, recognized by Carr (2010). In discussing Friedrich Nietzsche’s use of a typewriter and the 
supposed effect this had on his writing style, Nietzsche is quoted as saying that “Our writing equipment takes 




the course of many years of instruction and training, often undertaken as part of a formal education. 
Pen and paper may be simple technologies, but their proper use and exploitation comes only at the 
end of a rather prolonged period of socially-scaffolded neurological adaptation and configuration. 
Biotechnological bonding does not necessarily come for free; we often need to teach our brains how 
to press maximal cognitive benefit from the technologies we use.  
The history of writing also teaches us about the importance of social practices and conventions in 
enabling a technology to realize its full potential. In using writing technology, we follow a socially-
accepted set of principles and guidelines governing the proper use of those technologies, and, over 
time, those principles have evolved to enable the technology to meet its designed purpose. The 
importance of these social conventions is apparent when we look at early forms of writing. These 
were not necessarily conducive to cognitive enhancement in the way that later forms were. In fact, 
early forms of writing were heavily influenced by the traditions and practices of the preceding era, 
within which information was communicated by purely oral means. Writing initially assumed the 
form of a continuous stream of text (known as scriptura continua), which was devoid of any of the 
conventional orthographic features (such as word spacing and punctuation) that we now accept as 
standard features of a written text. The reason for this particular form of writing seems to be based 
on the fact that writing was initially seen as a means to record and re-present orally communicated 
information. It simply never occurred to the early writers that the new system of recording thoughts 
and ideas could be used independently of the spoken word: 
“It’s hard for us to imagine today, but no spaces separated the words in early 
writing.  In  the  books  inked  by  scribes, words ran  together  without  any  break 
across every line on every page, in what’s now referred to as scriptura continua. 
The lack of word separation reflected language’s origins in speech. When we talk, 
we  don’t  insert  pauses  between  each  word  –  long  stretches  of  syllables  flow 
unbroken from our lips. It would never have crossed the minds of the first writers 
to put blank spaces between words. They were simply transcribing speech, writing 
what their ears told them to write.” (Carr, 2010; pg. 61) 
Scriptura continua therefore seems to reflect an intermediate stage in the transition from oral to 
written culture. It was a form of writing that was heavily influenced by previous forms of information 
communication, and like many innovations, it took time for it to become optimally suited to its 
target audience. 
The  making  of  an  extended  mind  or  extended  cognitive  system  is  not,  therefore,  necessarily 
straightforward. It sometimes takes a long time for a technology to be available in the right form, 
and we sometimes need to engage in extensive training before we can derive maximum cognitive 
benefit from its use. In addition to this, the use of a technology is often guided by social conventions, 
and these need to be carefully aligned with both the form of the technology and our ability to use it 
(or our ability to learn how to use it). 
The Web: A Technology to Bond With? 
Writing is a good example of a technology that has exerted a profound influence on our cognitive 
capabilities.  Perhaps  no  other  invention,  other  than  the  invention  of  language  itself,  can  have 
exerted such an influence on our cognitive and epistemic potential both as individuals and as a 




invention of writing, the invention of the Web has provided us with a rich range of opportunities for 
cognitive extension and transformation, and, as is the case with writing, the transformative potential 
of the Web, both for society and ourselves, rests on a particular set of features concerning the 
availability, reliability and usability of the new technology. These features parallel those identified by 
Clark  and  Chalmers  (1998)  as  part  of  their  discussion  of  what  makes  an  external  information 
resource part an extended mind. In order for an information resource to legitimately count as part of 
an extended mind: 
1.  “…the  resource  must  be  available  and  typically  invoked”  (Clark,  2010).  [Availability 
Criterion] 
2.  “…any  information…retrieved  from  *the  non-biological  resource  must]  be  more-or-less 
automatically  endorsed.  It  should  not  usually  be  subject  to  critical  scrutiny  (unlike  the 
opinions  of  other  people,  for  example).  It  should  be  deemed  about  as  trustworthy  as 
something retrieved clearly from biological memory” (Clark, 2010). [Trust Criterion] 
3.  “…information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required” 
(Clark, 2010). [Accessibility Criterion] 
At present, it is unclear to what extent the Web, as currently constituted, possesses the kind of 
features that would support the emergence of environmentally-extended cognitive systems. The 
primary  problem  is  that  most  forms  of  cognitive  extension  depend  on  a  particular  form  of 
information flow and influence in which there is a close temporal coupling between the various 
elements that comprise the extended system. In the case of the extended mind, for example, it 
seems reasonable to insist that there should be some functional similarity in the influence exerted 
by both bio-external and bio-internal information sources. If external information should exert an 
influence on our thoughts and actions that is profoundly unlike that seen in the case of (for example) 
bio-memory, then it seems unlikely that we approach the kind of conditions under which genuine 
forms of mind-extending bio-technological integration take place. And if we think about the kind of 
informational contact we have with the conventional Web (the Web of HTML documents), then it 
seems unlikely that we will ever have a form of contact in which information can be accessed in a 
way that resembles the contents of our long-term memories. The nature of our contact with the 
Web seems to lack the kind of features that would make it the target of genuine forms of cognitive 
extension (see Smart et al., 2009). 
We should not necessarily be surprised by this conclusion. The Web is a relatively recent technology, 
and  it  is  still  undergoing  rapid  development  and  change.  As  we  saw  in  the  case  of  writing, 
cognitively-potent forms of biotechnological merger do not come for free. They are sometimes the 
end product of a complex, often co-dependent, process of technological innovation, social change 
and neural configuration. The relatively recent emergence of the Web means that we should not 
expect it to immediately fulfil all of our requirements in terms of its capacity for cognitive extension. 
It sometimes takes time for the true transformative potential of a technology to be fully realized. 
One specific way in which I think the history of writing informs our understanding of the current 
shortcomings of the Web (specifically concerning its capacity to support the emergence of extended 
cognitive systems) concerns the transition from early to modern forms of writing. We saw that early 
forms of writing, like the use of scriptura continua, were heavily influenced by the preceding oral 




optimized to take account of its new cognitive role. Like early forms of writing, I want to suggest that 
the current form of the Web (the Web of HTML documents) is heavily influenced and informed by 
the practices and conventions of the era that preceded it: the era of the written and printed word. 
When  information  is  published  on  the  Web,  it  is  typically  done  so  in  the  form  of  ‘pages’  that 
communicate information in much the same form as we would expect to see in a printed document. 
This mode of information presentation is, like early forms of writing, not necessarily best suited to 
the emergence of extended cognitive systems. But perhaps the current version of the Web is, like 
scriptura continua, an initial form of a technology that is attempting to free itself of the metaphors 
of a previous era and evolve into something that is far more suited to the realization of its true 
cognitive potential. What the history of writing teaches us is that we should not mistake the early 
forms of a technology as constituting the final word in terms of that technology’s ability to transform 
our cognitive capabilities.  
Creating the Cognitive Machine 
In general, much of the scientific interest concerning the effect of new Web-based technologies is 
concentrated  at  the  social  level.  New  technologies  have  been  seen  as  enabling  forms  of  social 
interaction and engagement that either reflect the dynamics of our existing social relationships or 
which give rise to new kinds of social processes. In one recent paper, Hendler and Berners-Lee 
(2010) discuss the implications of the Web in terms of the emergence of what they call ‘social 
machines’.  A  social  machine  is  a  form  of  Web  technology  that  works  in  concert with  a  human 
community to support interaction, collaboration and information sharing. According to Hendler and 
Berners-Lee, we are already witnessing the appearance of social machines in the form of social 
networking sites. However, the notion of the social machine is not just a way of conceptualizing the 
impact of a new technology on our social activities and processes. It is also a way of envisioning a 
particular  kind  of  capability;  in  particular,  one  that  demands  the  development  and  adoption of 
certain technologies. Hendler and Berners-Lee (2010) thus argue: 
“This  technology  is  needed  because  the  magnitude  of  the  problems  that  our 
society faces today are such that only the concerted effort of groups of people 
operating with a joint power much greater than that of the individual can hope to 
provide solutions. These problems, whether they be major issues such as curing 
cancer  or  addressing  climate  change,  or  more  local  like  the  creation  of  a 
community to address a social issue on the south side of Chicago, require people 
from a number of fields and backgrounds to work together. We believe that a new 
generation of Web technologies will be needed to address these issues...” (pg. 
157) 
The  notion  of  the  social  machine  thus  serves  a  dual  purpose:  it  focuses  our  attention  on  the 
potential effects of the Web in terms of the creation of new forms of social interaction, collaboration 
and information exchange, and it also establishes a set of goals that can be used to guide current 
technology development efforts.  
When it comes to considering the future technological evolution of the Web, it helps to think, not 
only  about  the  social  effects  of  the  Web,  but  also  about  its  cognitive  effects.  Just  as  new 
technological innovations may be seen as supporting the emergence of social machines, it is also 




extended cognitive machinery – how, in other words, they might give rise to what we could call 
‘cognitive machines’. As with the notion of social machines, the notion of cognitive machines serves 
a dual purpose. It acts as both a lens through which we can interpret some of the effects of the Web 
(specifically its effects on human cognition), and it identifies a set of capability targets that can be 
used to guide and orient technology development efforts. In particular, once we understand the kind 
of features that are required to support various forms of Web-based cognitive extension, we can use 
this understanding both to guide technology development and to anticipate the consequences of 
technology adoption.  
The transition to a Web that is capable of supporting the emergence of extended cognitive systems – 
or cognitive machines – requires a number of innovations, and together these innovations give us an 
alternative vision of the Web and the kind of interactive opportunities it affords. To describe all 
aspects of this vision would take too long, but it is worth focusing on a couple of areas of technology 
development that are already beginning to change our relationship to Web-based information. The 
first of these areas concerns the use of linked data formats to change the way information content is 
represented on the Web (Bizer et al., 2009). Such formats improve both the accessibility (in terms of 
the retrieval of specific pieces of relevant information) and versatility (in terms of flexible modes of 
presentation) of information content. The second area of technology development concerns the use 
of new kinds of display devices and augmented reality capabilities. These change the nature of our 
relationship  to  information  on  the  Web  by  making  that  information  more  accessible  and  more 
suitably poised to influence our everyday thought and action. Both of these areas of technology 
development and innovation are described in greater detail in the following sections. 
The Missing Link: Towards the Web of Data 
One relatively recent focus of scientific attention and technological innovation on the World Wide 
Web concerns the formats that are used to represent online information. Ever since the invention of 
the Web, the dominant way of representing information content has been via the use of HTML. 
Traditionally, information has been delivered in the form of HTML documents, which are accessed by 
browser technology and then presented to human users in the form of Web pages. This page, or 
document-centric  mode  of  representation,  has  significant  implications  for  how  we  access 
information content, and it affects the kinds of influence that Web-based information can exert over 
our thoughts and actions. If we want to enable the kinds of information flow and influence that 
support the emergence of extended cognitive systems, then we need to ensure that our contact 
with the Web fulfils the kind of criteria alluded to in the previous section (i.e. access, availability and 
trust). However, it is by no means clear that our current reliance on document-centric modes of 
information delivery do enable us to meet these criteria.  
As an example of the shortcomings of document-centric modes of information representation, think 
about  the  problem  of  accessing  factual  information  from  a  Web-accessible  resource,  such  as 
Wikipedia. Even if the delays associated with document retrieval (i.e. downloading) and presentation 
are  resolved,  the  user  is  still  confronted  with  the  onerous  task  of  surveying  the  document  for 
relevant information content. In most cases, this requires the user to scroll through the Web page 
and process large amounts of largely irrelevant content in order to identify the small amount of 
information that is actually needed. This is a very inefficient means of information access. Even if the 
user tries to isolate specific information items for use on multiple occasions, he or she cannot do this 




information to a local resource
14). Ideally, what is required in order for Web-based content to count 
as part of an extended mind is that the relevant factual content should be available to guide thought 
and action in the way we have come to expect our thoughts and actions to be guided by information 
retrieved from bio-memory. The problem with the conventional, document-centric Web – the Web 
of Documents – is that the relevant pieces of information that are required to guide, scaffold and 
constrain our thinking are usually embedded in a mass of other distracting information. This makes it 
difficult to see how current forms of Web-based content could have the right kind of functional 
poise to count as part of our personal body of knowledge and beliefs (see Smart et al., 2009). 
Fortunately, an alternative approach to the representation of online content is emerging alongside 
the conventional of Web of Documents. This is the Web of Data (Bizer et al., 2009), which is based 
on the idea that the Web should serve as a globally-distributed database in which data linkages are 
established by dereferenceable URIs. The transition from document-centric to data-centric modes of 
information representation is, I think, an important step in the technological evolution of the Web, 
particularly when it comes to the notion of Web-based forms of cognitive  extension
15. What is 
important for Web-based  forms of cognitive extension are flexible modes of data integration, 
aggregation, filtering and presentation, in conjunction with an ability to gear information retrieval 
operations to suit the task-specific needs and requirements of particular problem-solving contexts. 
The Web of Data supports these capabilities in a number of ways. In particular, it countenances 
representational formats that are: 
1.  largely  independent  of  specific  presentational  formats  or  usage  contexts  (this  supports 
flexibility in the way information content is presented; it also enables data to be used in 
different ways in different application contexts), 
2.  centred on the representation of limited sets of data or data items (this supports the rapid 
retrieval and presentation of specific pieces of information), and 
3.  semantically-enriched (this supports the retrieval of relevant information). 
This mix of features brings us a step closer to establishing the kind of state-of-affairs associated with 
the emergence of cognitively-extended systems and the mechanistic realization of environmentally-
extended mental states. The Web of Data is not necessarily the final step in this process, but it does 
provide an important link in the technological evolution of the Web, particularly as regards the 
future realization of cognitive machines. 
The Real World Web 
The  gradual  transition  from  document-centric  to  more  data-centric  modes  of  information 
representation is, I think, one of the ways in which the Web is evolving to provide new opportunities 
for cognitive augmentation and enhancement. However, without the correlative development of 
suitable interaction mechanisms, the potential for the new representational formats to genuinely 
transform our cognitive and epistemic potential is still somewhat limited. Although there are new 
                                                           
14 Links to sections within the page will not work because Wikipedia, like most Web 2.0 applications, features 
dynamic content, and the physical location of specific information items is liable to change across multiple 
usage contexts. 
15 Paradoxically, although the aim of the linked data initiative is to provide content  that is primarily suited for 
machine-based processing, while the aim of the conventional Web (the Web of Documents) is to provide 
content that is primarily suited for human consumption, it is the Web of Data that, I think, provides the better 




types of browsers that enable human users to browse the Web of Data, it is unlikely, I think, that 
these browsers will introduce any radically different forms of informational contact, at least relative 
to the kind of contact already afforded by conventional Web browsers. Rather than focus on the 
development of browser interfaces that simply take existing functionality and adapt it for the Web 
of Data, I suggest that we need to think about radically new forms of information display and user 
interaction. We need to move beyond the browser interface, which for too long has dominated our 
notions of informational contact with Web-accessible information resources. Instead, I suggest that 
we need to entertain a new vision of the Web; one which makes bio-external information resources 
suitably poised to participate in the emergence of environmentally-extended cognitive machines. Let 
us refer to this new vision of the Web as the ‘Real World Web’.  
As is suggested by its name, real world environments are at the heart of the concept of the Real 
World Web. The basic idea is that Web-based information should, wherever possible, be embedded 
in  the  real  world  and  easily  accessed  as  part  of  our  everyday  interactions  with  that  world. 
Information about everyday objects should be associated with those objects, information about 
locations should be accessible in those locations, and information about people should be ‘attached’ 
to those people. In all cases, the information should be immediately accessible and easily processed. 
It must be able to guide thought and action in the way in which our everyday cognition is supported 
by the information retrieval operations of our own biological brain. What this means, in effect, is 
that information should be immediately accessible to our perceptual systems. It should require little 
or no effort to make the information available for perception, and, in most cases, the information 
should  be  delivered  automatically,  with  little  or  no  conscious  effort  required  to  make  that 
information available.  
This vision is one which modifies our traditional modes of interaction with the Web in a number of 
ways. Instead of the retrieval of relevant information being entirely the responsibility of the human 
agent, the notion of the Real World Web advocates a more intelligent and proactive Web: a Web 
which  is  capable  of  anticipating  users’  information  requirements  and  making  that  information 
available in ways that support ongoing sequences of thought and action. It is also a vision that places 
the  Web  at  the  heart  of  our  everyday  embedded  interactions  with  the  world.  Rather  than 
information  access  requiring  perceptual  detachment  and  disengagement  from  our  immediate 
surroundings (something that is required even with the most portable of mobile devices) the notion 
of the Real World Web seeks to make Web-based information access a standard feature of our 
everyday  sensorimotor  engagements  with  the  world  –  it  seeks  to  make  the  Web  part  of  the 
perceptual backdrop against which our everyday thought and action takes shape. Finally, the notion 
of the Real World Web emphasizes a shift away from traditional browser-based modes of Web 
access,  featuring  the  use of  screen-based  displays, keyboard-based  interaction  mechanisms  and 
document-centred  representational  schemes.  In  place  of  conventional  screen-based  modes  of 
information access, the Real World Web emphasizes the importance of more perceptually-direct 
forms  of  information  access  (e.g.  the  use  of  augmented  reality  devices  to  overlay  Web-based 
information onto real-world objects and scenes). In place of conventional user interaction devices, 
such  as  mice  and  keyboards,  the  Real  World  Web  advocates  the  use  of  alternative  interaction 
mechanisms  (more  on  which  below);  and  in  place  of  conventional  document-centric  modes  of 
information representation, the Real World Web countenances a transition to more data-centric 
modes of information representation (see above). The main implication of this  shift away from 




light: as something more than a passive set of information resources that need to be coaxed into 
useful cognitive  service by our deliberate search and retrieval efforts. Our traditional modes of 
access with the Web encourage us to see the Web as something that is: 
1.  passive:  we  need  to  engage  with  the  Web  in  a  deliberate  manner  in  order  to  retrieve 
relevant  information.  Information  needs  to  be  discovered,  retrieved,  filtered  and 
interpreted; seldom does the Web support us in a proactive manner – providing the right 
information just when we need it.  
2.  distinct from our everyday interaction with the world: the Web may support our everyday 
decision-making and problem-solving behaviours, but, in general, this support comes at the 
cost  of  us  having  to  divert  our  attention  away  from  the  problem  at  hand.  Instead  of 
information being immediately available to support our thoughts and actions, we are often 
required to suspend what we are doing in order to ‘look things up’ on the Web. 
3.  impersonal: the information content of the Web is, in general, not geared to specifically suit 
our idiosyncratic problem-solving needs and concerns; often we have to access information 
from several sources and adapt it for our own ends.  
In  place  of  this vision,  the  Real World Web  gives us  a  vision of  the  Web  as  something  that  is 
proactive, personal and perceptually-immediate. Once we are afforded immediate perceptual access 
to Web-based information, and once such information becomes available at just the right time to 
support  our  goals,  interests  and  concerns,  then  such  information  becomes,  I  suggest,  far  more 
capable of fulfilling the kind of conditions that merit the emergence of cognitive machines. 
The Real World Web, it should be clear, relies on a rich range of sophisticated technical capabilities, 
most of which are, as yet, either unavailable or not in widespread use. This might be perceived as 
grounds for pessimism about the tenability of the Real World Web vision. However, for the most 
part, the kind of technological innovations required to make the Real World Web a reality are not 
beyond the reach of our current engineering capabilities, and, in some cases, early forms of the 
technologies are already starting to appear. One of the most interesting and relevant areas of recent 
technological innovation concerns the development of a range of highly portable augmented reality 
or mixed reality solutions. These are available in a variety of forms, from handheld mobile devices 
that  overlay  information  onto  a  real-world  scene  via  a  camera  and  screen  display,  through  to 
wearable-computing solutions, such as head-mounted displays and retinal projection systems. Most 
of these technologies are still the subject of ongoing research efforts; however, in most cases, the 
capability targets are clearly identified, and early prototypes of the systems are beginning to become 
available.  
One  research  program  that  is  seeking  to  develop  portable  projection  systems  that  present 
information directly to an individual’s field of view is the DARPA-funded ULTRA-Vis program
16. This 
program builds on the capability vision provided by mobile device eyewear systems
17, which display 
information directly to a user’s visual field using conventional eyewear equipment (e.g. spectacles). 
Some of the applications envisioned for this new technology include location-aware social network 
services,  real-world  visual  overlays  for  environment  navigation,  battlefield  situation  awareness 
displays, and immersive virtual reality systems for education and entertainment. Another focus of 
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current research attention concerns the development of advanced retinal projection systems that 
project information directly onto the retina of the eye. One such system, which is being developed 
by  researchers  at  the  University  of  Washington,  uses  a  set  of  microfabrication  techniques  to 
incorporate display micro-devices into a contact lens (Ho et al., 2008; Lingley & Parviz, 2008; Pandey 
et al., 2009). The contact lens is worn like any other contact lens, and it provides a see-through 
display that is both remotely powered and controlled via a wireless link. The ultimate promise of 
such devices is that they enable network-accessible information to be superimposed on real world 
objects and scenes, enhancing the kind of informational contact we have with our online world, and 
significantly  enriching  the  range  of  perceptual  cues,  prompts  and  affordances  that  guide  our 
everyday thoughts and actions.  
Unfortunately, the capabilities provided by these augmented reality/mixed reality technologies are 
only part of what is required to realize the vision of the Real World Web. In general, the technical 
realization of the Real World Web rests on research and progress in the following areas: 
1.  Augmented reality display devices. Considerable research effort has already been devoted 
to these kinds of devices. They assume the form of head-mounted displays, virtual retinal 
displays and augmented reality applications for handheld mobile devices. 
2.  Context-sensitive information retrieval and display capabilities. A key capability for the 
Real  World  Web  is  the  ability  to  proactively  support  the  user  in  his  or  her  everyday 
engagements with the world. This requires that information should be retrieved in a manner 
that is highly sensitive to the ongoing needs, interests and concerns of the human user. In 
particular,  it  means  that  information  retrieval  and  presentation  should  be  sensitive  to 
various  kinds  of  contextual  information,  such  as  the  location  of  the  user,  the  kind  of 
cognitive activities in which they are engaged, and the kind of objects with which they are 
confronted. Context-sensitive modes of information retrieval and presentation are the focus 
of a number of ongoing research efforts (Bahrami et al., 2007; Rhodes, 2003; Rhodes & 
Maes, 2000), and further progress in this area will probably require significant advances in 
our  ability  to  detect  particular  kinds  of  contextual  information  (for  example,  locations, 
objects
18,  people
19  and  situations
20),  as  well  as  our  ability  to  actually  represent  that 
information in a way that meliorates the information retrieval process (see Bao et al., 2010). 
3.  Data-centric  modes  of  information  representation.  The  use  of  linked  data  formats  to 
support the realization of the Web of Data was discussed earlier in the paper. In general, the 
Web of Data will provide an information space that is much more suited to the Real World 
                                                           
18 Improved object detection and recognition capabilities could come about as a result of advances in signal 
processing capability (including auditory as well as visual scene analysis capabilities), or they could stem from 
the  use  of  interventions  that  simplify  the  detection/recognition  problem  (e.g.  the  use  of  radio-frequency 
identification tags).  
19 Person identification is being supported by progressive improvements in our ability to use a variety of kinds 
of biometric information. This includes the recent development of human gait recognition (e.g. Nixon & Carter, 
2006) and ear morphology processing (Hurley et al., 2008) techniques, as well as the use of more conventional 
face processing technologies. 
20 In general, the ability to detect specific situations requires the integr ation of multiple types of contextual 
information,  and  it  may  therefore  be  somewhat  more  difficult  to  perform  compared  to  the 
detection/recognition of particular objects. One example of the kind of research being undertaken in this 
space is the attempt to monitor and infer mission status information from both physical and contextual cues 
(Poltrock et al., 2008). This research is being undertaken as part of a larger research effort to provide more 




Web  than  the  current  Web  of  Documents.  In  particular,  the  representational  formats 
adopted by the Web of Data support the targeted retrieval of specific pieces of task-relevant 
information. They also provide the basis for highly flexible modes of information display, 
enabling information to be presented as simple textual prompts and alerts, as simple graphic 
elements, or as more complex graphic overlays on a visual object or scene.  
4.  Flexible modes of information display. Flexible modes of information display are important 
because we will often want to present information in a way that best supports real-world 
decision-making. Sometimes this may involve the presentation of information in text-based 
formats; at other times we will need to make use of graphic objects that guide thought and 
action in particular ways (for example, our interaction with physical objects could be guided 
by the use of virtual visual affordances that supplement those already associated with an 
object).  Obviously,  it  will  be  important  to  avoid  situations  where  the  human  user  is 
overwhelmed  with  information,  so  the  use  of  intelligent  information  filtering  solutions 
(particularly those that are sensitive to the prevailing context) will be necessary in addition 
to advanced information display capabilities
21. 
5.  Low cost
22/minimal effort information retrieval solutions . A key element of Web-based 
forms of cognitive extension is likely to be the advent of low cost/minimal effort solutions to 
the problem of interacting with online resources. What this means, in effect, is that it should 
be possible to implement information retrieval operations in a way that is very rapid and 
which requires the minimum of physical effort. One promising line of research here involves 
the  development  of  sub-vocalization  techniques  for  Web-based  information  retrieval 
(Jorgensen & Binsted, 2005). This allows users to silently voice instructions and commands 
that could be used to control a variety of forms of interaction with the Web; for example, it 
could enable users to pose questions in natural language which could then be used to direct 
information retrieval operations
23. Another important strand of research and development 
concerns  what  are  commonly  referred  to  as  neuro-interactive  or  brain  interface 
technologies (Mason et al., 2007; Pfurtscheller et al., 2007)
24. These devices are based on 
the idea that by processing the electrical activity of the brain , we can establish a direct link 
between neural activity and environmental control, enabling our thoughts (or at least the 
neural signals associated with our thoughts) to control at least some aspects of our physical 
engagement with the world (see Nicolelis, 2001). 
As was mentioned previously, many of these capabilities are already the focus of ongoing research 
and development efforts, and there is, as such, a significant overlap between the  goals of many 
                                                           
21  One  interesting  line  of  research  here  concerns  the  use  of  subliminal  cuing  strategies  to  minimize  the 
cognitive load imposed on users (DeVaul et al., 2005). 
22 The notion of ‘cost’ here is intended to reflect the amount of time and physical effort that is required to 
access information; it does not refer to the financial cost of accessing information. Information access cost has 
emerged as an important construct in terms of the specific mix of resources (bio-memory, motor actions, shifts 
of attention) that are recruited to solve a problem (see Clark, 2008; pg. 119). In particular, it has been shown 
that low information access cost (measured in terms of the time taken to access information) promotes the 
adoption of a solution strategy that delegates much of the information retrieval burden to perceptuo-motor 
routines rather than the use of bio-memory resources (Gray & Fu, 2004).  
23 One associated capability here concerns the translation of natural language queries into more formal query 
languages, such as those used to retrieve information on the Web of Data. A number of techniques and 
technologies are emerging to support this translation capability (see Smart, 2008). 




extant technology development programmes and the kind of technological advances required to 
support the technical realization of the Real World Web. 
The notion of the Real World Web serves as a potential antidote to at least some of the criticisms 
made  by  commentators  such  as  Dreyfus  (2009)  and  Carr  (2010).  Dreyfus  (2009),  for  example, 
admonishes those who hype the benefits of the Web for such things as distance learning. Such 
claims, he argues, ignore the importance of embodied forms of interaction with the real world which 
serve to mediate many of our advanced learning experiences. Dreyfus is right, I think, to draw 
attention to the limits of a technology that distances itself from the facts of material embodiment 
and environmental embedding, but such criticisms should only serve to remind us of the limitations 
of the Web as it is currently constituted. Future forms of engagement with Web-based information, 
such as that envisioned by the notion of the Real World Web, need not be so remote from our 
everyday embodied interaction with the World, and, indeed, much of the power and potential of the 
future Web, from the perspective of cognitive enhancement, may stem from the fact that online 
information  is  much  more  productively  poised  to  shape,  scaffold  and  constrain  our  everyday 
embodied interactions the world.  
Carr  (2010)  also  criticizes  the  Web  in  terms  of  our  traditional  browser-based  access  to  online 
content. “A screen-based reading behaviour is emerging,” Carr claims, “which is characterized by 
browsing and scanning, keyword spotting, one-time reading and non-linear reading.” In fact, many 
of Carr’s concerns about the cognitive impact of the Web seem to be related to the current way in 
which we access online information and interact with the Web. It is not clear, for example, to what 
extent the putative effects of the Web on our ability to think, read and remember are purely the 
result of our currently popular forms of engagement with the Web (i.e. our use of conventional user 
interaction devices, HTML-based modes of information presentation and screen-based modes of 
information display). The important point, for present purposes, is simply that we should not see the 
properties of the current Web as defining the limits of its cognitive transformative potential. As we 
move  into  an era of  wearable  computers,  augmented  reality  display  devices,  and  Web-enabled 
objects
25, so we encounter   new opportunities for cognitively -potent forms of engagement  and 
interaction with the largest space of knowledge and information our species has ever seen.  
Creativity and Collective Cognition 
Thus far the discussion has centred on how the cognitive profile of individual human agents might be 
affected by current or future forms of the Web. There is, however, another aspect to this discussion 
that we haven’t touched on as yet. This is the role played by the Web in supporting episodes of 
collective or collaborative cognition. Ever since the advent of Web 2.0, which is characterized by 
greater levels of user participation in the creation, maintenance and editing of online content, the 
Web  has  provided  ample  opportunities  for  socially-distributed  forms  of  information  processing. 
Whether we choose to regard these forms of processing as genuinely cognitive or not (see Smart et 
al.,  2010c),  it  is  clear  that  the  Web  has  opened  up  new  ways  in  which  both  the  contents  and 
character of our cognitive activity can be influenced by other human agents.  
                                                           
25 The notion of Web-enabled objects (or the Web of Things) is simply the idea that everyday objects are 
integrated into the Web and are therefore Web-accessible. This means that objects may publish information 
about themselves and their current status on the  Web, and that, at least in some cases, objects may be 
manipulated  via  Web-based  forms  of  communication  (see  http://www.webofthings.com  for  more 




One way in which we might derive cognitive benefit from the Web is in terms of our collective 
creative potential. The Web facilitates the distribution of thoughts and ideas and these can, on 
occasion, stimulate the production of new thoughts and ideas. Our collective capabilities might be 
enhanced in this situation by virtue of the fact that exposure to the same idea will not necessarily 
produce the same cognitive response in all individuals. Individuals differ in terms of their expertise 
and experience and this may give rise to different kinds of cognitive responses. The widespread 
distribution  of  information,  in  this  case,  may  be  expected  to  stimulate  creativity  –  enabling 
individuals to respond in highly diverse ways to the same body of information and producing net 
gains in the total number of generated thoughts and ideas.  
The potential of the Web to support creative insight and intellectual progress is well recognized in 
the scientific community. As Stevan Harnad (1999) rightly notes, the Web allows us to accomplish 
something akin to ‘scholarly skywriting’ – scientific theories, thoughts, ideas, experimental results, 
and sometimes data, are made available in ways that are increasingly accessible to fellow academics 
and scientific colleagues. It is almost as if the outputs of scientific and intellectual enquiry were 
written in the sky for all to see.  
Such notions highlight two important aspects of Web-based forms of information distribution and 
idea propagation: global reach and immediate access. Just as if ideas had been written in the sky, the 
use of the Web as a distribution medium means that our ideas have the potential to reach a very 
large number of people. Furthermore, once our thoughts and ideas are published online, they are 
available for immediate access and can exert an influence on others with a speed that is unrivalled 
by conventional print media. Skywriting, suggests Harnad (2004), has a temporality that is akin to 
the speed of thought. The Internet, he suggests, supports rates of information flow and influence 
that parallel those seen in the oral tradition. It enables information to be exchanged at roughly the 
speed at which most of our thinking takes place: the speed of speech: 
“There  is  every  reason  to  believe that  our  talking heads  and  their  interacting 
minds will be incomparably more fecund once those lazy iterative cycles by which 
our  knowledge  had  been  created  and  cumulated  in  the  Gutenberg  era  are 
restored to the speed of stone-age thought by skywriting in the PostGutenberg 
Galaxy.” (Harnad, 2004) 
These  two  features  –  widespread  distribution  and rapid  dissemination  –  make  the  Web  hugely 
beneficial to our collective creative potential. Widespread distribution enables one idea to reach the 
minds of many others, thereby leading to productivity gains in the form of a greater number of 
diverse ideas. Rapid dissemination improves the rate at which new ideas get generated, thereby 
leading to efficiency gains.  
The problem with this optimistic image is that the mode of information distribution promoted by the 
Web does not always seem of great benefit to our collective cognitive endeavours, especially when 
it comes to the generation or discovery of novel solutions (Huynh et al., 2010; Lazer & Friedman, 
2007; Mason et al., 2005; Smart et al., 2010b). In our own research, for example, we have discovered 
that rapid and widespread modes of information distribution are not always the most effective for 
all types of collective problem-solving. In some cases, these modes of information distribution can 
actually stultify rather than stimulate collective creativity (Huynh et al., 2010; Smart et al., 2010b). 




distribution tend to encourage lots of agents to prematurely settle on a particular solution, and this 
effectively prohibits the pursuit of alternative solution paths that may ultimately lead to better long-
term outcomes. 
Findings from the social psychological literature seem to complement these findings. Thus, one well 
known  phenomenon  in  group  problem-solving  situations,  specifically  brainstorming  sessions,  is 
production  blocking  (Diehl  &  Stroebe,  1987).  Production  blocking  is  the  tendency  for  the 
contributions of one individual to block or inhibit contributions from other group members, resulting 
in an reduced level of creativity relative to what might have been expected if the group members 
had worked independently. It thus seems that, at least in some situations, the tendency to share 
information  can  undermine  the  collective  creative  potential  of  a  group  of  agents.  Instead  of 
stimulating a greater number and diversity of ideas, precipitant forms of information sharing can 
sometimes impede rather than improve the creative process.  
What we arrive at, therefore, is a dichotomy in our views concerning the potential impact of the 
Web  on  collective  creativity.  On  the  one  hand,  it  seems  that  the  information  distribution 
opportunities afforded by the Web stand to improve collective creativity. The Web enables us to 
distribute ideas to a global audience, and because we have immediate access to ideas as soon as 
they  become  available,  it  seems  that  the  Web  is  well  placed  to  deliver  both  productivity  and 
efficiency gains when it comes to the generation of new ideas. On the other hand, it seems that the 
Web could potentially undermine our collective creative capabilities. The Web supports modes of 
information distribution that are both rapid and widespread, and these may lead to reductions in the 
number of unique ideas that get generated.  
At this point, critics will be keen to point out that although the Web does potentially support rapid 
and widespread modes of information distribution, these are seldom, if ever, achieved in reality. The 
sheer size of the Web, it will be argued, means that any new idea will have limited distribution 
simply because it will tend to get lost in the noise of other competing information. Being able to 
publish your ideas in the sky does not necessarily increase their distribution if everyone else is 
publishing to the same place. Each idea will at best have limited uptake by the members of a 
community, and the chances are that it will processed at very different times. The end result will be 
that no one working on a particular problem is going to be exposed to exactly the same information 
at exactly the same time. There will always be some differential exposure to particular subsets of 
information. 
This is an interesting line of defence because the size of the Web has often been seen as a source of 
problems relating to information overload and information retrieval. It probably never occurred to 
anyone to see the size of the Web as a means of obviating modes of information distribution that 
might otherwise prove pernicious to collective cognitive processes. The problem, of course, is that 
the difficulties posed by the Web’s size (in terms of the problems it presents for information access 
and distribution) have been the focus of considerable recent research attention and technological 
innovation. We now have search engines, recommender systems, tagging systems, Google alerts, 
RSS feeds, Twitter recommendations, taxonomies, collaborative filtering capabilities, folksonomies, 
ontologies, social networking sites
26 and so on, all of which aim, in one way or another, to put us in 
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touch with specific subsets of information. When these information filtering technologies become 
widely adopted by a particular community, they serve to support precisely the kind of information 
distribution  profile  that  might  prove  problematic  for  collective  creativity.  They  ensure  that  all 
members of a particular problem-solving community – members of a distributed scientific team, say 
–  all  get  exposed  to  the same  ideas  at  the  same time.  The  specific  worry  about  this  mode  of 
information distribution is that it may very well encourage a community to come to a premature 
consensus about some problem, situation or other state-of-affairs, and thereby limit the pursuit of 
more productive intellectual trajectories.  
Perhaps the key point to note here is that we should not necessarily assume that a particular mode 
of information distribution is always beneficial for cognitive processing. Neither should we assume 
that  technologies  that  supposedly  help  us  locate  relevant  information,  such  as  search  engines, 
collaborative filters, and so on, are always beneficial (or even benign) in terms of their cognitive 
consequences. In some cases, these filtering technologies may not so much broaden our intellectual 
horizons (by exposing us to a global space of diverse thoughts, ideas and views) as restrict our 
attention to a particular part of the information space, namely, that part that has already been the 
focus of lots of other individuals’ browsing efforts
27. When it comes to the increasing availability of 
online  scholarly information  content, Evans  (2008)  notes that electronic modes of in formation 
distribution have not necessarily resulted in academics being exposed to more ideas.  Instead Evans 
argues that the transition to online modes of distributing scientific content is accompanied by a 
progressive narrowing in the focus of the academic community. At the heart of this phenomenon is 
the fact that the online world often channels our search efforts to particular places on the Web – as 
we follow a particular set of links, we end up following the same well-worn intellectual paths and 
trajectories that have been traversed by many of our peers. As Carr (2010) notes: 
“Automated information filtering tools, such as search engines, tend to serve as 
amplifiers of popularity, quickly establishing and then continually reinforcing a 
consensus about what information is important and what isn't.” (pg. 217) 
Thus, although the vision of scholarly skywriting is one in which researchers are rapidly put in touch 
with lots of diverse ideas and scientific findings, it is possible that our attempts to harness the power 
and potential of the Web have inadvertently led to a narrowing of scientific focus and attention, 
reducing our ability to maximally exploit the creative opportunities that the Web provides.  
To summarise, it is really too early to tell what the precise effects of the Web are on our collective 
creative potential. Much more fundamental research work needs to be done, and we are only just 
beginning to understand how cognitive processing is influenced by the dynamics of information flow 
and  influence  in  distributed  network  environments.  One  notion  that  may  be  useful  in  our 
understanding  of  this  relationship  is  the  notion  of  adaptive  coupling  (see  Smart  et  al.,  2010c). 
Adaptive  coupling  is  simply  the  idea  that  the  various  elements  of  a  cognitive  system  need  to 
establish time-variant patterns of functional connectivity with one another such that the overall 
information processing performance of the entire ensemble (the cognitive system) is optimized. In 
this  case,  we  need  to  understand  how  systemic  performance  is  affected  by  different  temporal 
profiles  of  information  flow  and  influence,  and,  in  all  likelihood,  different  kinds  of  cognitive 
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processing will demand different kinds of temporally-specific functional coupling. In the case of 
creative insights, for example, it may be important to introduce inefficiencies into the information 
distribution process, or it may be important to ensure that not all individuals get exposed to the 
same information at the same time. Perhaps one way in which this can be accomplished is by 
diversifying the kinds of recommender systems, filtering capabilities or Web search algorithms that 
get used to retrieve information. Thus, rather than encouraging everyone to adopt exactly the same 
information  retrieval  solution,  it  may  be  important  to  encourage  the  use  of  different  tools, 
algorithms  and  classification  systems
28.  It  may  also  be  important  to  recognize  the  value  of 
occasionally removing ourselves from outside sources of influence  –  effectively  disconnecting 
ourselves  from  the  network-mediated  flow  of  information  and  ideas.  One  of  the  elements  of 
creativity is incubation (Wallas, 1926) – the period during which a problem is put aside, thereby 
allowing non-conscious processes to productively operate on problem-relevant information. It is 
during  these  periods  of  disconnection  that  we  perhaps  enable  the  incubation  process  to  get  a 
thorough foothold, and, therefore, perhaps a judicious mix of engagement and disengagement with 
online resources – the essence of the adaptive coupling thesis – is precisely what is needed to 
maximally exploit the cognitive potential of the World Wide Web. 
Cognition and the Web: An Agenda for Web Science 
The  Web  shows  all  the  signs  of  being  a  technology  that,  like  the  invention  of  writing  and  the 
mechanical clock, is poised to transform both society and ourselves. Given the Web’s transformative 
potential, and the important role it already plays in so many of our daily activities, the scientific 
study of the Web, and its relationship with wider society, has recently been proposed as the basis of 
a  new  scientific  discipline  called  Web  Science  (Berners-Lee  et  al.,  2006;  Hendler  et  al.,  2008; 
Shadbolt & Berners-Lee, 2008). Web Science treats the Web as its main focus of scientific study, but 
its remit extends beyond a simple analysis of the technical underpinnings of the Web. Web Science 
recognizes  the  complex  relationships  that  exist  between  technology,  society  and  individuals.  It 
recognizes that technological innovation on the Web may impact society, perhaps giving rise to new 
forms  of  social  interaction  and  engagement.  Web  Science  also  recognizes  that  technological 
innovation takes place against a complex sociological and psychological backdrop: a backdrop that 
includes, among other things, moral and ethical codes, legal constraints, social conventions and 
cognitive capabilities. Web Science is not, thus, purely techno-centric in focus. It recognizes that we 
are shaped by technologies and that we in turn shape the technologies we use.  
Given the importance attached to understanding the bidirectional nature of the influences that exist 
between the Web and its users, Web Science is, by its very nature, highly interdisciplinary in focus. 
This makes it ideally suited to examining the complex inter-relationships that exist between human 
cognition  and  the  Web.  Web  Science  is  also  a  discipline  that  combines  analytic  and  synthetic 
                                                           
28 Typically, the focus in  many classification-oriented  modelling activities is to  establish a common  set of 
community-wide  constructs  that  can  be  used  for  resource  classification  purposes.  Thus,  in  ontology 
engineering, the aim is usually to create a single ontology that reflects consensual views as the conceptual 
structure of some domain of discourse. In cases where multiple, distinct ontologies arise, perhaps as a result of 
divergent  views  and  perspectives  (see  Smart  &  Engelbrecht,  2008),  a  range  of  ontology  reconciliation 
techniques  have  been  developed  to  support  the  mapping  and  merger  of  the  ontologies  (Kalfoglou  & 
Schorlemmer, 2003; Noy, 2004). The result of these reconciliation techniques is to establish a unitary view of a 
domain that may (at least in some situations) function to further limit the diversity of resources a particular 




approaches. It seeks to develop an understanding that is grounded in empirical analysis, but it also 
aims to use that understanding as the basis for influencing the Web’s development. Web Science 
thus provides an ideal interdisciplinary context in which many of the issues raised in this paper can 
be pursued in greater detail. It enables us to study the psycho-cognitive impact of the Web in its 
various forms (the Web of Documents, the Web of Data, the Web of Things, and so on), and  it 
enables us to develop future Web technologies that best support cognitive processing at both the 
individual and collective levels.  
The following highlights some strands of Web Science research that could be undertaken in order to 
improve our understanding of the relationship between human cognition and the Web. This is by no 
means  a  complete  list.  Notable  omissions  include  the  design  and  implementation  of  various 
technologies (e.g. applications, devices, protocols, representational formats) that are required to 
maximise the cognitive benefits of the Web. Another omission relates to the philosophical issues 
concerning Web-based forms of cognitive extension and collective intelligence (Halpin et al., 2010; 
Smart et al., 2009).  
1.  Cognitive  Effects  of  the  Web.  This  strand  of  research  aims  to  investigate  the  cognitive 
effects of the Web; in particular, the effect the Web has on aspects of our offline cognitive 
performance profile. One specific line of enquiry concerns the performance of both ‘heavy’ 
and ‘light’ Web users on a range of psychological tests, such as those used by Ophir et al 
(2009) to measure cognitive control. We saw in the case of Ophir et al (2009) that heavy 
media  multitaskers  exhibited  a  cognitive  profile  that  was  characterized  by  bottom-up 
attentional control strategies. It will be interesting to see whether the heavy use of the Web 
is associated with a similar cognitive profile. 
2.  Subjective Effects of Reliable Information Access. We saw that a key aspect of the vision of 
the Real World Web concerns our immediate and reliable access to information. It will be 
interesting to see what effect this kind of access to information has on our subjective sense 
of our epistemic capabilities. For example, if a particular body of information was always 
available to us whenever we needed it be so, would we start to experience a shift in our 
epistemic relation to that information? Would we start to feel as if that external body of 
information was just as much a part of our own personal body of knowledge and beliefs as 
the contents of our bio-memories? The key issue here concerns the factors that influence 
our sense of when we are in possession of a particular body of information. What factors 
conspire to make us feel as though we ‘know’ something
29? Is it something to do with the 
way in which our semantic memories are implemented, or is it something to do with the 
                                                           
29 There is a side issue here concerning whether our sense of what we know is informed by the same processes 
that determine the content and character of much of our conscious experience. According to one influential 
theory of consciousness, our subjective perceptual experiences stem from an implicit knowledge of what are 
called  sensorimotor  contingencies  or  sensorimotor  dependencies  (i.e.  our  knowledge  and  expectations 
concerning the effect of movement or change on patterns of sensory stimulation)  (Noë, 2004; Noë, 2009; 
O'Regan & Noë, 2001). It is interesting to contemplate whether our sense of what we know may be governed 
by an implicit knowledge of what I call ‘epistemic contingencies’ (i.e. our knowledge and expectations about 
the way in which specific kinds of information are made available by particular thoughts and actions). In the 
same  way  that  our  subjective  sense  of  the  visual  scene  is  informed  by  our  knowledge  of  how  visual 
information reliably changes when we (e.g.) move our heads, our sense of what we know may be informed by 
our  knowledge  of  how  (linguistic?)  information  reliably  becomes  available  to  us  whenever  we  engage  in 




mere accessibility and availability of information – the fact that the things we know are 
(usually) poised to influence our thoughts and actions irrespective of where we are and what 
we are doing? If our sense of what we know is limited by the availability of information, then 
it seems that a transition to something like the Real World Web may promote a profound 
shift in our sense of what we feel we know. If all the information on the Web was made 
available to us in a way that was similar to the information made available by our bio-
memories, would we begin feel as though we knew the entire contents of the Web? And, 
irrespective of any subjective changes, when does it make social and scientific sense to say 
that  we  genuinely  know  something?  Could  the  boundaries  of  our  semantic  memories 
coincide with the information contents of the Web? If not, why not?  
3.  Web Content and Cognitive Processing. Building on the results of studies investigating the 
effect  of  hypertext  on  memory  and  comprehension  processes,  it  will  be  important  to 
understand how the various features of Web content relate to cognitive processing. One 
strand  of  research  that  could  be  undertaken  here  seeks  to  more  fully  understand  the 
relationship between hyperlinks and aspects of cognitive performance. For example, are the 
disruptive effects of heavily hyperlinked resources mediated by an increase in cognitive load 
(see DeStefano & LeFevre, 2007)? A second issue for research concerns the relationship 
between  Web-based  multimedia  content  and  cognitive  function.  For  example,  does  the 
existence  of  multiple  information  streams  on  a  particular  Web  page  disrupt  a  user’s 
comprehension or memory of the page’s content
30? Finally, as we move into an era where 
linked data content is becoming more widely available on the Web  of Data, we need  to 
better understand the cognitive effects of our access to linked data resources. In particular, 
we need to  know how the presentational and interactive mechanisms de veloped for the 
Web of Data affect memory and comprehension processes. 
4.  Collective Cognition and the Web. The effect of the Web on collective cognitive processing 
is poorly understood. We need to understand whether the advent of the Web is a boon or 
burden  for  such  things  as  collective  creativity.  Of  particular  interest  is  the  question  of 
whether  our  use  of  information  filtering  technologies,  like  search  engines,  limits  the 
exposure of a particular community to a particular set of facts and whether this contributes 
to the kind of phenomena seen in group problem-solving situations; for example, production 
blocking (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987) and the common knowledge effect (Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
Conclusion 
Throughout  history,  technologies  have  exerted  a  significant  influence  on  humanity.  Some 
technologies  have  contributed  to  profound  forms  of  socio-economic  change,  fundamentally 
transforming the nature of social activities and the structure of social relationships. Others have 
contributed to a profound change in our cognitive profiles, fundamentally transforming the way we 
think about the world, modifying the basic character of our cognitive processes, and occasionally 
extending the reach of our cognitive capabilities. Like the transformative technologies that preceded 
                                                           
30 One reason to think that multiple information streams may negatively impact a user’s memory of Web page 
content stems from a study investigating the effect of visually complex environments on factual recall. Bergen 
et al (2005) investigated whether the visually complex environment used by CNN during news broadcasts 
negatively affected college students’ ability to recall news-related facts. They showed that factual recall was 
worse  in  the  standard  visually  complex  environment  as  when  compared  to  a  more  simple  environment 
consisting of the news anchor alone with all other information items (e.g. news crawls, stock quotes, weather 




it, the Web is a technology that is potentially poised to influence both society and ourselves. At 
present, much of the empirical research related to the Web has focused on its social and societal 
impact:  the  effect  the  Web  is  having  on  social,  political  and  cultural  processes.  However,  the 
cognitive impacts of the Web are also an increasing focus of scientific interest and research. Future 
empirical research should improve our understanding of the  precise impact of the Web on our 
cognitive functioning, and this understanding will serve to guide the development of future Web-
based technologies. 
Whatever the outcome of future empirical studies, we need to bear in mind that the Web is a 
complex evolving system. Our views about its cognitive impacts are, in all likelihood, historically 
specific. Even if it could be shown that the current version of the Web is exerting a largely negative 
influence on our cognitive capabilities, this by no means implies that future versions of the Web will 
fail to deliver cognitive benefits. As we saw in the case of writing, some technologies take time to 
become ideally suited to support cognition, and perhaps something similar is true of the Web. As 
was the case with writing, our ability to gain maximal cognitive benefit from the Web will depend on 
a progressive optimization of the technologies we use and the social conventions that dictate how 
we use them. The current Web is surely an important point in our cultural and intellectual history, 
but it need not be the final word in terms of our cognitive and epistemic transformation. Perhaps, 
with time, we will come to see the current Web as laying the groundwork for more potent and 
profound forms of cognitive enhancement – an important, albeit temporary, milestone en route to 
our Web-enabled cognitive future. 
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